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Once We’re Done Honeymooning: Obergefell v.
Hodges, Incrementalism, and Advances for Sexual
Orientation Anti-Discrimination
Jeremiah A. Ho1
Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court’s marriage equality decision
in Obergefell v. Hodges is the watershed civil rights decision of
our time. Since United States v. Windsor, each recent victory for
same-sex couples in the federal courts evidenced that the legal
recognition of same-sex marriages in the United States was
becoming increasingly secure. Meanwhile, momentum was
growing for the visibility of sexual minorities nationally. Yet, is
marriage equality the last stop in the pro-LGBTQ movement, or
should we expect sexual minorities to advance in other legal
arenas? Should we expect that the recent strides in marriage
equality from Windsor to Obergefell can somehow leverage
broader protections for LGBTQ individuals beyond their marital
relationships?
This Article begins from the perspective that the marriage
equality movement is an increment in the longer process for
securing legal protections for sexual minorities. Recently
advancements in sexual orientation have been somewhat
successful, and now that marriage equality is finally secured,
progress for protecting sexual minorities should navigate toward
reforms in federal anti-discrimination laws. Although many of
the judicial victories in the marriage cases have been specifically
effective toward recognizing the relationships of same-sex
couples, there have also been some significant judicial strides

1
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Wood, Jessica Almeida, and Cathy O’Neill. Much thanks to the University of Massachusetts for
funding this research. Lastly, much gratitude for the work of Joseph Sherman and the staff at the
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from post-Windsor cases and Obergefell that could be
instrumental for furthering progress in areas of sexual orientation
anti-discrimination. This Article discusses how such judicial
advances ultimately bolster autonomy rights in sexual identity
that anti-discrimination laws, specifically Title VII, ought to
protect, but currently do not.

INTRODUCTION
Despite some segments of the social consciousness reeling from the gravity of
victory after Obergefell v. Hodges,2 the period that recently led to Obergefell and
marriage equality has been part of a larger enduring transition, where social and
legal norms about same-sex couples are still rapidly readjusting from a not-sodistant past where discrimination, exclusion, and inequality were all stagnantly
commonplace.3 For guidance on pondering this moment normatively, a glimpse at
history toward other critical periods of transition can prove helpful as a starting
place to give us perspective on how to characterize the meaning of this particular
time for sexual minorities and on what we ought to consider for sexual orientation
in the next incremental progression toward equality and recognition.
Borrowing from presidential campaign history, an interesting but unexpected
example comes from Ronald Reagan’s road to reelection in 1984. Reagan’s
campaign capitalized on the strength of his first term in the White House with an
effective metaphor that signified both his achievements and what ought to continue
so long as his reelection was assured.4 Calling the moment “a morning” from the

2
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (holding that same-sex couples may not be
denied the fundamental right to marry); see generally The Associated Press, Historic Gay Marriage
Ruling Stirs Emotion Across US, ASSOCIATED PRESS: THE BIG STORY (June 26, 2015, 8:06 PM),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/12a175ff5e0a4f5d8542d3861d219431/look-gay-marriage-reaction-acrossus.
3
See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2011) (“No State,
territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage . . . .”), invalidated by United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013); 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(13) (1993) (“The prohibition
against homosexual conduct is a longstanding element of military law that continues to be necessary in
the unique circumstances of military service.”), repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-321 § 2(f)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 3515, 1516; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986)
(“Precedent aside, however, respondent would have us announce, as the Court of Appeals did, a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. This we are quite unwilling to do.”), overruled by
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
4
See ROBERT E. DENTON, JR., THE PRIMETIME PRESIDENCY OF RONALD REAGAN: THE ERA
OF THE TELEVISION PRESIDENCY 64 (1988) (“By the reelection of 1984, the advertisers who had
produced Pepsi commercials brought their skills to Reagan the product. The spots proclaimed that ‘It’s
morning again in America’ . . . .”).
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domestic turbulence of the 1970s and hitching on the notion that what Reagan
brought to the country in the 1980s was a new age,5 this idea of a new dawn from
the Reagan-Bush campaign crystallized into an ad titled, “Morning in America.”6
From the first few seconds of the ad, “Morning in America” wastes no time stoking
an atmosphere of prosperity in the 1980s, a triumph from the suggested economic
and social darkness of the 1970s, through tranquil images of dawn’s gilded early
light shimmering across boats, piers, and tall buildings along a quiet harbor; of
middle-class Americans suited up and earnestly going to work; and of a family of
four pulling up in their station wagon to a new white-picket home and moving
their belongings inside.7 Meanwhile, statistics carefully woven into a sobering
voice-over message explained why it was exactly that moment, at the end of
Reagan’s first term, that was politically and metaphorically “morning” again in
America: “Today more men and women will go to work than ever before in our
country’s history. With interest rates at about half the record highs of 1980, nearly
2,000 families today will buy new homes, more than at any time in the past four
years.”8
Hard to ignore, from this Article’s perspective, is the next set of images that
marries both social and economic prosperity by depicting a handsome, white
opposite-sex couple engaged in a classic church wedding celebration, while we are
told that “this afternoon 6,500 young men and women will be married. And with
inflation at less than half of what it was just four years ago, they can look forward
with confidence to the future.”9 The initial exposition of a new morning juxtaposed
with the ad’s use of this marriage scene as one of its centerpiece observations
suggests both the progression of norms that political conservatives at the time
valued and found worth bolstering—or protecting—in a possible second Reagan
term.10 The ad smartly proposes that this is the norm that the new morning
unapologetically has in store for the rest of this new ensuing day: a return to a

5
See GIL TROY, MORNING IN AMERICA: HOW RONALD REAGAN INVENTED THE 1980S 12
(2005) (“The first part [of Reagan’s storyline] tells the sad tale of America in the 1960s and 1970s, a
country demoralized, wracked by inflation, strangled by big government . . . . The result [of Reagan’s
revolution] was Morning in America . . . .“).
6
Reagan-Bush ’84: Prouder, Stronger, Better (Tuesday Team: Hal Riney Sept. 17, 1984),
http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1984/prouder-stronger-better. This reelection spot
became known more popularly as “Morning in America.” Presidential Campaign Commercials 1952–
2012,
1984:
Reagan
v.
Mondale,
MUSEUM
OF
THE
MOVING
IMAGE,
http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1984/prouder-stronger-better (last accessed Apr. 4,
2016).; see also Daniel R. Ortiz, The Difference Two Justices Make: FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life,
Inc. II and the Destabilization of Campaign Finance Regulation, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 141, 158–59
(2008) (describing images portrayed by Reagan’s campaign advertisement).
7
Reagan-Bush ’84, supra note 6.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
See id.
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conventional family-values rhetoric that might have been temporarily forgotten in
the interim of the 1970s.11
It is not until the ad finally fixates over an image of a stately view of the Capitol
Building at daybreak, stoically white and alabaster, that the statistics give way to
whom or to what the ad intended to sell: “Under the leadership of President
Reagan, our country is prouder and stronger and better. Why would we ever want
to return to where we were less than four short years ago?”12 Beyond fulfilling
campaign goals, the message embedded in the morning-after metaphor was also
self-congratulatory. As the Reagan-Bush campaign portrayed, this morning in
America represented not just mere progress from the late 1970s,13 but significant
evisceration of some kind of shadowy, night-time turmoil left by the Carter
administration and what the Democrats in this election cycle were meant to
signify.14 This new morning, within the age of social and political conservatism,
had possibilities and norms symbolized by family station wagons and white
heteronormative church weddings that could all be wrecked if Reagan’s streak was
cut prematurely short—norms that, according to the ad, bore the possibility of
bringing the nation relief and tranquility.15 This observation was the implicit
promise in exchange for reelection.
As far as that morning was concerned, Reagan had substantive reasons for
being able to manipulate the realities of prosperity to construct the ad’s narrative.
The commercial’s messages and images reflected some of the social and economic
realities of the day while it tried to positively associate such realities with romantic,
updated notions of American middle-class values, patriotism, and tranquility.16
Simultaneously, Reagan was taking credit for the victories during his first term and
leveraging for the next step, setting up what that step could look like. Yet 1984 was
not without its troubles.17 The Cold War between the United States and the thenSoviet Union was still being waged,18 and in 1986, two years after Reagan’s

11
See Ronald Reagan, Republican National Convention Acceptance Speech (July 17, 1980)
(“[W]ith the virtues that are our legacy as a free people and with the vigilance that sustains liberty, we
still have time to use our renewed compact to overcome the injuries that have been done to America
these
past
three-and-a-half
years.”)
(transcript
available
at
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3406); see also National Family Week, 1982,
Proclamation No. 4999, 47 Fed. Reg. 51,547 (Nov. 16, 1982), reprinted in 96 Stat. 2789–90 (1982).
12
Reagan-Bush ’84, supra note 6.
13
See id. (“Why would we ever want to return to where we were less than four short years ago?”).
14
See TROY, supra note 5, at 12 (“The first part [of Reagan’s storyline] tells the sad tale of America
in the 1960s and 1970s, a country demoralized, wracked by inflation, strangled by big government,
humiliated by Iranian fundamentalists, outmaneuvered by Soviet communists, betrayed by its best
educated and most affluent youth.”).
15
See Reagan-Bush ’84, supra note 6.
16
See id.
17
See infra notes 18–24 and accompanying text.
18
See JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE COLD WAR: A NEW HISTORY 224–25 (2005) (“Reagan
accelerated Carter’s increase in American military spending: by 1985 the Pentagon’s budget was almost
twice what it had been in 1980.”).
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reelection, the Iran-Contra Affair would break out.19 The American economy was
only gradually correcting itself from what was then the worst recession since the
Depression,20 and only three years later, in October 1987, the stock market would
crash.21 The treatment of AIDS was still at its early stages,22 and its associative
stereotypes with the gay community were resonating loudly.23 And finally, it is
important not to forget that 1984 was only two years before the United States
Supreme Court criminalized same-sex intimacy in Bowers v. Hardwick.24
Still, there were enough substantive domestic achievements for Reagan to
employ his morning-after metaphor for leveraging his ideas and agendas. Not slow
to marry symbolic American iconography with conservative values, the ad ends
with the raising of the American flag, allowing the campaign to appropriate
Americanism with Reagan’s norms, as the voice-over firmly declares with selfassurance and promise, “It’s morning again in America.”25
The period after United States v. Windsor,26 the decision that found Section 3
of the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional,27 could be conceived as a
metaphorical morning for sexual minorities in the United States. Calling this
moment such is a self-congratulatory move—as self-congratulatory as Reagan’s
advertisement, with his idealized day of prosperity in 1984.28 Yet, the metaphor of
the “morning after” also serves a critical and normative purpose beyond the
laudatory; affixing this moniker both acknowledges and reifies that a sense of light
is now cast upon a grave period of uncertainty for same-sex couples in the United
States29 and anticipates what is to come. What will the rest of that day look like? In

19
See generally REPORT OF THE CONG. COMMS. INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR
WITH SUPPLEMENTAL, MINORITY, AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS, S. REP. NO. 100-216, H.R. REP. NO.

100-433, at 285 (1987) (“On [November 2, 1986], a Lebanese magazine, Al-Shiraa, reported that the
United States had sold arms to Iran . . . .”).
20
See Victor Zarnowitz & Geoffrey H. Moore, The Recession and Recovery of 1973–1976, 4
EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. RES. 471, 473 (1977) (“In terms of overall decline in output and the rise in
unemployment, the 1973–1975 recession was more severe than any of the five earlier recessions of the
post-World War II period.”).
21
E.g., Tim Metz et al., Stocks Plunge 508 Amid Panicky Selling, WALL STREET J., Oct. 20,
1987, at A1.
22
See James W. Curran & Harold W. Jaffe, AIDS: The Early Years and CDC’s Response, CDC
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (SUPP.) 64, 64 (2011).
23
See Lawrence K. Altman, New Homosexual Disorder Worries Health Officials, N.Y. TIMES,
May 11, 1982, at C1 (“Federal health officials are concerned that tens of thousands more homosexual
men may be silently affected and therefore vulnerable to potentially grave ailments”).
24
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 578 (2003).
25
Reagan-Bush ’84, supra note 6.
26
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
27
See id. at 2695.
28
See Reagan-Bush ’84, supra note 6.
29
See Jess Bravin, Supreme Court to Decide Whether States Must Recognize Same-Sex Marriage,
WALL STREET J. (Jan. 16, 2015, 7:09 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-to-decidewhether-constitution-requires-states-to-recognize-same-sex-marriage-1421440632 (“A ruling against
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the year after Windsor, the movement behind sexual minority rights in the United
States had reason to reflect upon its progress, vindication and triumph, relief, and
the possibility of continuing progress for marriage equality for sexual minorities and
sexual orientation anti-discrimination on the whole. President Obama echoed this
sentiment in his statement following Windsor, indicating that a direction for gay
rights was achieved through triumph over adversity:
This ruling is a victory for couples who have long fought for
equal treatment under the law; for children whose parents’
marriages will now be recognized, rightly, as legitimate; for
families that, at long last, will get the respect and protection they
deserve; and for friends and supporters who have wanted nothing
more than to see their loved ones treated fairly and have worked
hard to persuade their nation to change for the better.30
Since then, a new day has dawned for same-sex couples federally—and it has
subsequently dawned across various states. By January 2014, roughly six months
after Windsor, six states had moved to legalize same-sex marriage.31 And then, by
the beginning of 2015, thirty-seven states were permitting same-sex couples to
marry, compared to only ten states prior to Windsor.32 Finally, the victories in the
morning after Windsor progressed onto the larger victory of marriage equality
nationwide in the figurative afternoon with Obergefell. Normatively, the law has
moved toward recognition of sexual minorities, their relationships, and their rights.
But, like Reagan’s 1984 ad,33 the morning after Windsor that led up to the
afternoon of Obergefell has not been without its realities. Within the entirety of
the LGBTQ rights movement,34 and beyond the recent progress for same-sex
marriage, much remains to be accomplished federally. Though the Supreme Court
marriages could cast legal uncertainty over thousands of marriages, particularly in states where officials
would like to reinstate bans that have been struck down in the courts, and create a split in [the] country
between states that allow same-sex unions and those that don’t.”).
30
Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, Statement by the President on the
Supreme Court Ruling on the Defense of Marriage Act (June 26, 2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/doma-statement.
31
See Richard Socarides, The Growing Impact of the Supreme Court’s Gay-Marriage Ruling,
NEW YORKER (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-growing-impact-ofthe-supreme-courts-gay-marriage-ruling (reporting that New Jersey, Hawaii, Illinois, New Mexico,
Utah, and Oklahoma were moving to legalize same-sex marriage).
32
See Freedom to Marry, Inc., Winning the Freedom to Marry: Progress in the States, FREEDOM
TO
MARRY
(Jan
26,
2015),
https://web.archive.org/web/20150126190222/http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/; see also Rhode
Island Becomes 10th State to Legalize Gay Marriage, NBC NEWS (May 2, 2013, 4:39 PM),
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/05/02/18023197-rhode-island-becomes-10th-state-tolegalize-gay-marriage?lite (reporting ten states with marriage equality legally in effect at the time
Windsor was decided).
33
See Reagan-Bush ’84, supra note 6.
34
In this article, I use the terms “LGBTQ,” “gay,” and “homosexual” interchangeably.
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has decided on the recognition of same-sex couples in marriage, the protections for
sexual minorities are still not the same as those for other minority groups expressly
covered under federal laws, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.35
Sexual orientation is still not a classification recognized consistently and uniformly
for protection under the highest constitutional scrutiny.36
And then there have been what seem like setbacks. Progress for the passage of
the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA)37 has been stalled, first by the
conflict caused by its religious exemption,38 and then by complications from the
Supreme Court’s 2014 ruling in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.39 Thus, it is significant
to pause upon the recent “new day” for sexual-orientation rights in the marriage
cases via Windsor, post-Windsor, and Obergefell to study how possibly and
normatively the advances in marriage equality should prove helpful to the law’s
conceptualization of sexual orientation as a protected category and within antidiscrimination law federally, such as Title VII. Specifically, in the post-Windsor
same-sex marriage cases, the narrative of marriage discrimination against sexual
minorities has been refined, not merely as a story of inequality, but more so as one
of indignity brought about through animus that the law now must rectify.40 This
jurisprudential development must continue in order to deem the setbacks small for
future progress regarding how the law treats sexuality. In the wake of the many
successes on the marriage equality front, we cannot forget that one of the original
goals of marriage equality was the protection of sexual orientation and sexual
minority identities.41 So far this stretch between Windsor and Obegerfell was
momentous for same-sex marriage recognition, but the moment and the period

35
See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, §§ 701–16, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66
(codified in scattered sections U.S.C). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from
discriminating on the basis of sex, religion, race, color, and national origin, but it does not prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation. See id. § 703(a), 78 Stat. 255 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e–2 (2011).
36
See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1207 (D. Utah 2013) (declining to analyze
equal protection claim by same-sex couples under heightened scrutiny because sexual orientation was
not recognized by the Tenth Circuit as a suspect class).
37
Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 2013, H.R. 1755, 113th Cong. (2013).
38
See Jennifer Bendery & Amanda Terkel, Gay Rights Groups Pull Support for ENDA Over
Sweeping Religious Exemption, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5, 2014 10:59 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/08/enda-religious-exemption_n_5568736.html
39
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014) (finding a contraceptive
mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to violate the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act as applied to a closely held corporations).
40
See, e.g., Susannah W. Pollvogt, Windsor, Animus, and the Future of Marriage Equality, 113
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 204, 206 (2013) (“[W]ith Windsor, the Court declared that animus remains
a relevant concept in the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence and confirmed that proving the presence
of animus is a viable strategy for winning a marriage equality challenge.”).
41
See Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, OUT/LOOK:
NAT’L LESBIAN & GAY Q., Fall 1989, at 8, 12 (arguing that marriage litigation would “most fully test[]
the dedication of people who are not gay to full equality for gay people, and [and it is] also the issue
most likely to lead ultimately to a world free from discrimination against lesbians and gay men”).
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after ought to be about LGBTQ rights ultimately. What must we do after
achieving marriage equality, when we are essentially done honeymooning? We
must recognize the advancements before us, provided by the recent marriage cases,
and see their incremental potential for eventual objectives and accomplishments
beyond same-sex marriages and into sexual orientation anti-discrimination.
This Article seeks to bring together the recent triumphs of the marriage
equality movement from Windsor to Obergefell with the next possible moments
for sexual orientation anti-discrimination. Beyond this Introduction, Part I
provides an incrementalist perspective on the developments in Windsor that have
then shaped further advances in post-Windsor cases—exemplifying, in particular,
the convergence of Justice Kennedy’s animus and dignity concepts into a mediating
principle. Part II will then trace the role of this mediating principle in postWindsor cases that have been helpful, not just for marriage equality, but also for
finding sexual orientation worthy of heightened scrutiny and suspect classification
under equal protection theory—especially how animus and dignity concepts have
persuaded courts to view sexual orientation favorably as an immutable trait. Part III
will then look at how this developed view of immutability in post-Windsor cases
should reflect an increased importance on autonomy for sexual identities. Part IV
will discuss Obergefell and how its doctrinal resolution for same-sex marriage
dovetails with prior advances for autonomy and immutability from the postWindsor cases, despite falling short of endorsing sexual orientation as a quasisuspect or suspect classification. And consequently, before concluding, Part V will
discuss normatively what such progress between Windsor and Obergefell should
leverage in the development of sexual orientation anti-discrimination. Specifically,
this development could justify broadening Title VII to be more inclusive of sexualorientation discrimination.
Like the victory observed and expressed in Ronald Reagan’s “Morning in
America” ad in 1984,42 the post-Windsor moment offers a stopping point of
reflection. The morning after Windsor should look progressively for the
possibilities that lie within this entirely new day for LGBTQ rights.
I. INCREMENTALISM WITHIN THIS INCREMENT: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
NIGHT BEFORE
In characterizing the developmental nature of the marriage equality movement
in the United States, it would be easy (though not entirely inaccurate) to describe
the progress as slow and stagnant for quite a lengthy duration in the early days.
Same-sex marriage cases in the 1970s, such as Baker v. Nelson,43 only nascently
attracted attention for the issue, but they did not reach merited success. Progress

42
43

See Reagan-Bush ’84, supra note 6.
See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971).
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has only hastened within the past fifteen years, once recognition for same-sex
couples was achieved through civil unions in Baker v. State,44 and then finally
through making marriage legally available to same-sex couples in cases such as
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,45 Varnum v. Brien,46 Kerrigan v.
Commissioner of Public Health,47 and Windsor.48 Describing the movement
summarily in this way would obscure a more watchful study of how the details
within that narrative of success and setbacks helped shift legal perceptions about
same-sex couples, but also more broadly, describing the movement in this way
would demonstrate how sexuality should be regarded in the law, and how all of it
has eventually led to this “morning after.” The following discussion focuses on the
recent trend toward marriage equality with an incrementalist methodology and
extends my previous examination of these issues49—both of which help us track and
posit the leveraging of sexual minority rights beyond marriage equality.

A. Parameters for Incrementalist Thinking
A more detailed narrative would consider how the night-and-day shift between
earlier decades denying same-sex marriages and the recent successes brought on by
cases that recognized marriage between same-sex couples had between them one
long incremental period of progress for the perception of sexual minorities that fits
within the classic path often needed for a society to legally accept the idea of samesex marriage. It is often a three-step process to reach the inevitability of marriage
equality.50 Studied comparatively by Kees Waaldijk,51 William Eskridge,52 and
Yuval Merin,53 this particular three-step process is one that I have previously
termed as “marriage equality incrementalism,”54 and one that I have found
coincides well within political philosopher David Braybrooke’s and economist

44

Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
46
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa 2009).
47
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481–82 (Conn. 2008).
48
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
49
See generally Jeremiah A. Ho, Weather Permitting: Incrementalism, Animus, and the Art of
Forecasting Marriage Equality After U.S. v. Windsor, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (2014) (exploring
“Windsor’s animus-focused jurisprudence as the convergence of both marriage equality and
incrementalism”).
50
See id. at 7.
51
Kees Waaldijk, Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the
Netherlands, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL,
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 437, 439–40 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenæs eds.,
2001).
52
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY
RIGHTS xiii–xiv (2002).
53
YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES: THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF GAY
PARTNERSHIPS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 326 (2002).
54
Ho, supra note 49, at 7.
45
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Charles Lindblom’s classic studies on the characteristics of disjointed
incrementalism.55 Within marriage equality incrementalism, Waaldijk, Eskridge,
and Merin have identified that for a society to begin legally recognizing same-sex
couples in marriage the following must happen: (1) same-sex intimacy must be
decriminalized; (2) efforts toward anti-discrimination for sexual minorities must be
instituted; and (3) recognition of same-sex relationships must arise.56 Once these
three steps have been reached, marriage equality is possible—if not inevitable.57 In
my previous work, I revised Waaldijk, Eskridge, and Merin’s original conceptions
of Step Three from strictly marriage to also same-sex relationships and noted that
Windsor brought us into Step Three federally.58 As Waaldijk, Eskridge, and Merin
each have noted, for a society with a history of heavy intolerance toward sexual
minorities and for its political consciousness in gradually accepting the concept of
same-sex marriage, these steps are significant—not merely for the concept itself,
but also for recognizing and elevating the identities of sexual minorities at the same
time.59 Indeed, this simultaneous outcome of accepting the identities of sexual
minorities within the achievement of marriage equality is what makes this process
so “necessary,” as Merin puts it:
[T]he fight of gays for inclusion in the institution of marriage
should not be examined as an independent claim; rather, it
should be assessed in light of the status of gay men and lesbians
in Western societies in general and in fields of law other than
marriage. The recognition of same-sex couples, I argue, is
dependent upon and connected to the status of gays in fields
other than family law. Developments such as the repeal of
sodomy laws and the enactment of antidiscrimination statutes are
required for the later recognition of same-sex couples in family
law.60
Waaldijk concurs by observing similarly that “once a legislature has provided that it
is wrong to treat someone differently because of his or her homosexual orientation,
it becomes all the more suspect that the same legislature is preserving rules of
family law that do precisely that.”61 Eskridge illustrates the same sentiment with a
cause-and-effect analysis:
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Repeal of sodomy laws emboldens some gay people to come out
of their closets and emboldens the uncloseted to organize
themselves politically and press for other equality assurances. The
more openly gay people there are and the better organized they
are politically, the greater attention officials will pay to their
arguments for equal legal entitlements, even if popular attitudes
are otherwise unaffected.62
Hence, assuming there is legal and historical intolerance toward sexual minorities, a
society’s recognition of both its sexual minorities and their rights to marry those of
their sexual preference seems to progress in complimentary fashion. This pairing
shares observations about underlying goals of the marriage equality movement as
well as reminds us that the original strategies for litigating over marriage had in
mind legal protections for sexual minorities.63
Beyond the elevation of the societal perceptions of sexual minorities, another
observation can be made about incrementalism in marriage equality that looks to
the shape of that progress. Unintentionally, these three steps might create a
straightforwardly linear progression. However, one can clarify how each step is
actually reached and surpassed by referring to Braybrooke’s and Lindblom’s original
thesis on disjointed incrementalism,64 as well as to theoretical refinements later
made by Andrew Weiss and Edward Woodhouse.65 The evolutionary and
incremental progression of a political issue is often fraught with ways in which
successes and setbacks push and pull to reach from one major step to the next,
which reflects almost a collective back-and-forth mental processing of a significant
issue—conservative at times in speed and yet democratic in nature for securing
majoritarian or popular confidence and almost predictively progressive once the
outcome of this issue processing has been reached.66
According to Braybrooke’s and Lindblom’s theory, disjointed incrementalism is
preoccupied with gradual, “synoptic” changes that propel the status quo, rather
than drastic overnight changes that occur instantaneously.67 There are no “one fell
swoop” movements here.68 Instead, at the societal level, these synoptic changes are
products of bounded rationality that is mimetic of a cyclical process of thought that
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slowly ruminates forward on a complex issue with stops and starts in between,
rather than a swift and facile journey from one goal to another.69 In the study of
incrementalism, Braybrooke and Lindblom liken such a journey to “embark[ing] on
a course of mental activity more circuitous, more complex, more subtle, and
perhaps more idiosyncratic than [] perceive[d].”70 The resulting progress and
insight is produced after messy and unhastened vetting that Braybrooke and
Lindblom anthropomorphize as “[d]odging in and out of the unconscious, moving
back and forth from concrete to abstract, trying chance here and system there,
soaring, jumping, backtracking, crawling, sometimes freezing on point like a bird
dog.”71 Lindblom’s attempts to characterize incrementalism as a science of
“muddling through”72 and to illustrate it as if it were a mental struggle to process a
complicated issue reiterate the importance of recognizing the journey as a highly
nuanced one—emphasizing the “increment” aspect of the process. Weiss and
Woodhouse have since taken his expressive descriptions of those circuitous
moments of decision-making and identified actual political processes—or what
they call, “stratagems”—that happen in that development, partly to bolster
Lindblom’s theory, but also to respond to criticism that incrementalism mistook for
a more simplified path from one step to the next.73
In furthering the study on marriage equality incrementalism, my previous work
married these stratagems to examples of the political process in between the three
steps in marriage equality incrementalism that demonstrate why, despite
appearances, the path to marriage equality has climbed more circuitously than
linearly and why a study regarding incrementalism must be more forgiving toward
the lack of simple linearity from one step in the progress to the next.74 So it is
expected that, even with same-sex marriage, an incremental climb up the three
steps, from decriminalizing same-sex intimacy to recognizing same-sex coupling,
has not been one smooth transition, but one with trials and errors that still
hopefully push toward progress for sexual minorities.75 In this way, it also makes
sense that when progress reaches a “step,” that this “step” might itself include trial
and errors and revisions.76 This back-and-forth, start-and-stop attribute of
incrementalist progress also explains, in the long haul, why the goal of sexual
orientation anti-discrimination figures as the second step in marriage equality
incrementalism but is likely an issue for which marriage equality should help
leverage once same-sex marriages are uniformly recognized. If protection of sexual
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orientation from discrimination was one of the ultimate goals of the marriage
equality movement, then this logically suggests that the three steps of marriage
equality incrementalism themselves likely amount to an “increment” that fits within
a larger, more encompassing incrementalist journey toward full recognition and
acceptance for sexual minorities and their rights. Knowing this characteristic,
Weiss and Woodhouse’s stratagems facilitate understanding of the post-Windsor
moment to see how the development can leverage further progress. This Article
will demonstrate that this kind of involved and “messy” movement noticeably
buttresses accomplishments that facilitate progress from one step to another.
As to Windsor, I have previously asserted that, within the particular events in
our modern consciousness since the early 1970s, all three steps for marriage
equality incrementalism identified by Waaldijk, Eskridge, and Merin have finally
been reached on the federal level in order to bring us this morning-after.77 First, the
Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas in 2003 decriminalized same-sex intimacy by
overturning Bowers v. Hardwick (Step One).78 Then, Congress repealed Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell in the military in 2011 (Step Two).79 And lastly, the decision in
Windsor that overturned Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
initiated recognition of married same-sex couples on the federal level (Step
Three).80 It is important to note that the state (and not the federal) governance over
marriage in the United States qualifies for a revision of Step Three to recognize not
only same-sex marriages, but also same-sex relationships, and that Windsor only
started the venture into Step Three but did not fully complete the journey to
solidify a footing that allows for progress that fully recognizes same-sex
matrimonial unions on the federal level.81 Obergefell completes Step Three.
Between the two Supreme Court cases (Windsor and Obergefell), it was the
patchwork incrementalism among the states themselves82—with more than forty
federal district and/or circuit cases on same-sex marriage, mostly following
Windsor—that brought the issue back to the Supreme Court for more extensive
treatment that furthers the trip in Step Three.83 Now, the question is where we are
headed once the moment for marriage equality has been reached. If further
developments for anti-discrimination are where we are going, then what ends,
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other than marriage equality, do these recent post-Windsor achievements
accomplish?

B. The Essentialist-Constructivist Continuum
Noting Lindblom’s characteristics for disjointed incrementalism within the
process in which recognition of same-sex marriage incrementally progressed toward
quickened inevitability, I have argued that, at least federally, the evolution of the
perception of same-sex couples in the law also brought about a major recalibration
of the push-pull between essentialist-versus-constructivist notions about sexual
orientation.84 By decriminalizing same-sex intimacy, Lawrence began that
recalibration.85 But a very notable stride in this shift is how Windsor continued this
recalibration by perpetuating pro-gay essentialist-constructivist ideas about sexual
identity as it relates to same-sex couples. After the federalism issue, when he began
to critique DOMA substantively, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor analyzes
the animus-filled impetus that led to the passage of DOMA in 1996 and to his
determination that DOMA could not survive constitutionally.86 In order to find
animus, the opinion reaches toward the congressional House Report during the
legislation of DOMA and cites specific portions that helped to highlight that
“[t]he House concluded that DOMA expresses ‘both moral disapproval of
homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with
traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality.’”87 Those specific portions of the
congressional House Report reflected debates over homosexuality and its
incongruity within the heteronormative and religiously moral family setup.88
Because of the argument that procreation was readily possible, in the most “natural”
sense, to opposite-sex couples from intimate engagement, but not readily possible
from intimate engagement for same-sex couples, the Report construed same-sex
relationships as something biologically deviant from opposite-sex relationships.89
All of this problematic logic was aligned with what the House Report called the
“natural teleology of the body.”90 Thus, what troubled Kennedy in Windsor, it
seemed, was a skewed anti-gay argument based on biology that was narrowly
focused to exclude same-sex couples from legal recognition of marriage and reached
vacant biological conclusions about same-sex relationships, which was used
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symbolically to represent the identity.91 Under the Report’s line of reasoning,
choosing to be in a same-sex relationship, one that is not premised in an oppositesex union, would seem irrational and contrary to the procreative goals of traditional
marriage, and that choice would be morally condemned. Personal choice and
autonomy in this area of marriage had to be subordinated to biological goals.
Intrinsically, the logic and message of the House Report was simple: an individual
could still naturally procreate in marriage so long as that individual belonged within
an opposite-sex marriage, rather than choosing a same-sex relationship, and as far
as gay identities were concerned at the time, judgments about choice figured largely
in assumptions about the etiology of “being gay” and was usually negative.92
In essence, this emphasis on biology could be prescribed as an admonishment
for homosexual orientation and how the choosing of that sexuality over a
heterosexual one also affords no favor in the law. Framed in that way, there was
very little space in that premise to accept a broader perspective about relationships
and sexuality that validated decisions made by same-sex couples. As a result,
sexualities other than those that would reinforce heteronormative and JudeoChristian preferences were aberrant according to this scheme. This justification for
DOMA, which used biology to create an anti-gay essentialist view of same-sex
couples, later came under fire in Windsor when Kennedy read within it a moral
blameworthiness that led to both the practical and symbolic effect of DOMA on
same-sex couples:
DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual tradition of
recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage here
operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and
responsibilities that come with the federal recognition of their
marriages. This is strong evidence of a law having the purpose
and effect of disapproval of that class.93
With that connection, he uncovered the appropriate level of animus to determine
unconstitutionality.94
It is merely one thing to find animus, but it is another to tie this animus to
perspectives on sexual orientation within the law. Justice Kennedy’s finding of
animus in Windsor, and the outcome of his majority opinion, rejects the possible
narrowness and exclusivity of an essentialist perspective that was harnessed in an
anti-gay way by DOMA’s proponents, because not only did it exclude benefits and
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rights to same-sex couples, but it also ultimately demeaned them on both legal and
societal levels. It was by arriving at this result that Windsor overturned DOMA to
allow states to craft outcomes that emphasize a possible broader perspective on
relationships—one that could let individual goals of marriage remain untouched.95
Although Kennedy did not explicitly weigh in on the nature of sexuality in
Windsor, he recognized that “[r]esponsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the
dignity and integrity of the person”96 and that autonomy in forming identities—
even through coupling—needs to be protected in order to avoid indignity: “In
acting first to recognize and then to allow same-sex marriages, New York [state]
was responding ‘to the initiative of those who [sought] a voice in shaping the
destiny of their own times.’”97 With its anti-gay, essentialist philosophies, DOMA’s
pre-emption of New York’s response rendered the conclusion that DOMA “seek[s]
to injure the very class New York seeks to protect” and was “strong evidence of a
law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of [that] class.”98 In other words,
Kennedy’s opinion asserted a broadened respect for the ability of individuals to
make choices beyond DOMA’s heteronormative and anti-gay essentialist
paradigms and to protect the dignity of couples, same-sex or otherwise.

C. The Animus-Dignity Connection
The connection between animus and dignity in Windsor has been a significant
one because it reflects incrementalism and serves as a device to leverage from
Windsor to other marriage cases in many respects. First, the pairing itself reflects
not only an incrementalist climb, but also serves important purposes in the
negotiation of further incrementalist progress in pro-LGBTQ protections. Up until
Windsor, within the significant gay rights cases at the Supreme Court, all written
by Justice Kennedy, the use of animus and dignity rights have had their incremental
and assorted appearances. Animus was first raised within the context of sexual
orientation in Romer v. Evans,99 in which Colorado’s Amendment 2, a voter
approved referendum to ban any specified legal protections of gays and lesbians
from discrimination, was found to be constitutionally challenging because “the
amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it
affects.”100 Kennedy imported this animus from other equal protection cases outside
of sexual orientation, like United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,101
and then identified it in Amendment 2 in order to construct his holding that such
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animus made the legislative process irrational enough to fail a test for rational
basis.102 There was no explicit mention of the concept of dignity in Romer;
Kennedy’s preoccupation with the animus that led to the passage of Amendment 2
was that it served to represent disapproval of a class and that the purpose of this
animus was to disadvantage the group that Amendment 2 was intended to
burden.103 Only a small shadow of the idea of dignity was hinted at in Romer,
when Kennedy wrote that the way Amendment 2 was constructed “inflicts on [gays
and lesbians in Colorado] immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and
belie any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it.”104 Certainly dignitary
harms could constitute some of the “injuries” within those Kennedy saw resulting
from Amendment 2; but Kennedy did not single out or prioritize dignitary harms
in Romer, and so, the injuries to which he referred could also encompass the actual
denial of certain rights more concretely than rights to human dignity. Part of the
reason for keeping a connection between animus and dignity submerged in Romer
could have been that Kennedy had to write more narrowly in Romer, as his opinion
would still be living in the shadow of Bowers v. Hardwick, which was still in effect
at the time and permitted the criminalizing of same-sex intimacy.105 Since Bowers
allowed states to brand sexual minorities as criminals for engaging in behavior that
might reflect orientation, then discussing the dignity rights of sexual minorities in
Romer would have created a visible paradox.
Indeed, it was not until Kennedy’s opinion in the context of overruling Bowers
in Lawrence v. Texas that he officially brought to attention the dignitary harms
inflicted upon sexual minorities from state sodomy statutes. However, even in
decriminalizing same-sex intimacy, the concept of animus was sufficiently relegated
to the background—in historical accounts of sodomy laws in America106 and in
locating the root of modern sodomy laws against same-sex intimacy—as Kennedy
framed the Bowers ruling as “making the broader point that for centuries there
have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral” and that
such “condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and
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acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family.”107 Kennedy’s language
here, describing the “condemnation,” was reminiscent of his discussions of animus
in Romer as a moral disapproval of a class.108 Still, animus was not directly raised as
a predominant reason to overrule Bowers in Lawrence; rather, the court based its
ruling on the harms to dignity in regulating private conduct.109 Kennedy spoke of
animus and the Romer analysis as a “tenable argument,” but also as problematic
doctrinally to resolve with Bower’s continuing validity.110 Instead, dignity was at the
forefront of the discussion, appearing in the case’s preoccupation with overruling
Bowers on liberty concerns rather than equal protection ones.111 After all, Lawrence
was framed within autonomy and privacy interests from the outset, and the
invocation of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and its
application to the case made the dignitary harms concerned more easily
extrapolated from the context of privacy and contraceptives into the realm of samesex intimate conduct.112 Citing the passage in Casey regarding the use of
contraceptives as “choices central to personal dignity and autonomy”113 and that
“[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, and of the universe, and of the mystery of human life,”114 the court noted
that these choices “are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”115 Kennedy then articulated that likewise “[p]ersons in a homosexual
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.
The decision in Bowers would deny them this right.”116 Kennedy’s preoccupation
here was with the stigmatizing effect of sodomy laws—even those that were not
readily enforced in certain states:
If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so
remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might
remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal
protection reasons. When homosexual conduct is made criminal
by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both
in the public and in the private spheres. The central holding of
Bowers has been brought in question by this case, and it should
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be addressed. Its continuance as precedent demeans the lives of
homosexual persons.117
This criminalizing effect—couched in terms of “stigma” and “demean”—solidified
the connection to Casey and autonomy when Kennedy observed that “[t]he stigma
[the Texas] criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial”118 and that it was “a
criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged.”119
Thus, animus remained within the backdrops of the Lawrence reasoning, while
dignity was introduced and extensively used to contextualize the type of harm
justifying Bower’s overruling.
The connection between the two concepts was later fully illustrated when
Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Windsor.120 While discussing DOMA’s
discriminatory effect against sexual minorities in Windsor, Kennedy linked animus
and dignity together more explicitly than he did in Romer or Lawrence.121 First,
DOMA was borne of legislative animus—a moral disapproval that was reinforced
by anti-gay essentialist notions about same-sex relationships—that had an
intolerable purpose, which Kennedy found was “to impose inequality.”122 But he
further located the dignity rights implications by illustrating that the inequality
created by animus in DOMA spoke to the identity of same-sex individuals in the
society—stigmatizing them in their relationships and the families they created.123
The furtherance of the two concepts in Windsor was not Kennedy’s original
invention, as lower courts that perpetuated the same-sex marriage issue between
Lawrence and Windsor had made the connection before.124 But with Windsor, the
connection between animus and dignity in the context of marriage discrimination
against sexual minorities was highlighted federally at the highest judicial level.125
Kennedy fit the connection doctrinally and centrally into his calculation of
DOMA’s unconstitutionality under equal protection.126 Although others have
couched this case as more of a federalism case,127 the appearance and connection of
animus and dignity were undeniable, serving several purposes and reflecting an
incrementalist gesture. From Romer to Lawrence, the individual concepts were
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introduced in the sexual orientation context;128 and in Windsor, the connection was
more fully galvanized into the reason why such discrimination is
unconstitutional.129 In many of these post-Windsor cases, this stated connection
between animus and dignity has since served as a template for discussions in lower
courts and has percolated into further variations that persuaded courts to permit
and recognize same-sex marriages. For instance, as Cary Franklin has pointed out,
the animus-dignity connection is what she refers to as an anti-stereotyping or
mediating principle that not only contextualizes the narrative of sexual orientation
discrimination, but also helps courts further justifiably doctrine that protects sexual
minorities.130 The next part of this Article will explore the use of the animusdignity connection as such a negotiating device in how heighted scrutiny and
suspect classification for sexual orientation has been reached in the post-Windsor
morning. Part IV will then evaluate the continued use of animus and dignity as an
anti-stereotyping device in Obergefell.
II. ELEVATION AND EXTENSION OF ANIMUS AND DIGNITY CONCEPTS
POST-WINDSOR
This continuing incrementalist progression has brought the same-sex marriage
debate into a moment where the probability of equality has become less of a debate,
partly through the developments in the recent lower and circuit marriage equality
rulings since Windsor, and partly through how the animus-dignity connection has
illustrated the effect of marriage inequality on sexual minorities and their humanity.
Post-Windsor and pre-Obergefell, lower courts began to import into and elaborate
upon Kennedy’s animus-dignity connection in their own resolutions concerning
such discrimination and have particularly utilized the broadness of Kennedy’s
language in Windsor to explore the animus-dignity connection in marriage and
sexual orientation discrimination even further.131 Just as the federalism issue in
Windsor could be seen as a way that Kennedy was able to force a discussion on
marriage inequality132—a discussion that ultimately lead to that focus on animus
and on dignity rights—the post-Windsor moment was an interesting one for
incrementalist study even merely for observing how subsequent courts and litigants
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have used some of the open-endedness of the animus-dignity connection in
Windsor to reinterpret doctrinally how denying same-sex couples the right to
marry constitutes discrimination. Essentially, courts in post-Windsor marriage
cases have picked up where Justice Kennedy left off. Some federal cases in this vein
have been more hermeneutical, so to speak, than others. For instance, some have
utilized the opportunity for importing influence from Windsor’s animus-dignity
connection not merely to resolve the inequality stemming from marriage
discrimination, but to push the boundaries of sexual orientation protection further.
In this fashion, two instances come to mind. First is a post-Windsor case by the
Ninth Circuit that has become noteworthy for this leveraging: SmithKline
Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories.133 This case exemplifies the incrementalist
progressive spiral as it applied Windsor to determine that sexual orientation was
worthy of heightened scrutiny protection in a case outside of the marriage equality
debate.134 The second instance involves post-Windsor lower court development
within marriage equality to determine, among other constitutional theories, that
state same-sex marriage bans violate federal equal protections of sexual orientation
and classified sexual orientation as a protected trait. Obergefell v. Wymyslo,135 a
district court case from Ohio, bears direct importance for Supreme Court inquiry as
it was one of the federal cases consolidated for the appeals that eventually led to
Obergefell v. Hodges.136 The judicial holding that sexual orientation was
appropriate for heightened equal protection. Wymyslo differed from the large
plurality of other post-Windsor marriage equality cases that rendered due process
and equal protection violations based on fundamental rights and/or other equal
protection theories but did not hold sexual orientation as worthy of heightened
scrutiny. Both instances on the federal level—SmithKline and Wymyslo—offer an
opportunity for rich incrementalist study into the use of the animus-dignity
connection post-Windsor to elevate notions of sexual orientation and identity in
the law federally as we continue to linger in Step Three of the marriage equality
incrementalism.

133

SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 483 (9th Cir. 2014).
See id.
135
Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013), rev’d sub nom. DeBoer, 772
F.3d 388, rev’d sub nom. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608. For the remainder of this Article, this opinion
in Obergefell v. Wymyslo from the Southern District of Ohio will be referred to in passing as Wymyslo
in order to avoid confusion with its later Supreme Court appeal, Obergefell v. Hodges.
136
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05.
134

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. I04

A. SmithKline and Heightened Scrutiny
The level of scrutiny in Windsor was never expressly articulated.137 Indeed if
such silence by Windsor has been the focus of much scholarly debate, then it also
seems plausible that courts have offered different interpretations of that silence as
well—although mostly in ways favorable to same-sex couples.138 This slippage is
exactly what provokes collective ruminations that hopefully result in incrementalist
evolutions on an issue. A conservative and exegetical reflection over previous
animus cases at the Supreme Court-level (including Romer) would likely render
the conclusion that the level of scrutiny that the animus-dignity connection
triggered in Windsor was a more “searching” or “toothful” form of rational basis.139
There is room to debate this determination, and the marriage cases after Windsor
have interpreted Windsor’s silence by protecting sexual orientation on different
levels of scrutiny.140
In a move that some might find more hermeneutical, SmithKline, a nonmarriage equality case, read Windsor as applying heightened scrutiny.141 It reached
this interpretation through the use of Justice Kennedy’s animus-dignity
connection.142 By doing so outside of the marriage equality context and purely in a
sexual orientation discrimination context, the SmithKline case arguably played a
part in incrementally pushing progress forward from the marriage equality
movement and back into the broader steps for protecting sexual orientation from
discrimination. At minimum, this transition demonstrates the observation reflected
in one of Weiss and Woodhouse’s stratagems that the incrementalist path
sometimes encompasses a sequencing of trials, errors, and revisions over a political
issue.143 This also makes sense to both the leveraging up to heightened scrutiny
from Windsor’s silence and the return to anti-discrimination, even after some of
the advances there were met to accomplish Step Two in marriage equality
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incrementalism when Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell was repealed in 2011.144 Again, the
illusion of incrementalism is linear, but progress is often realized in a more
wayward, win-some-lose-some shape.145 This observation from Woodhouse and
Weiss might explain why SmithKline’s finding of heightened scrutiny as
appropriate for sexual orientation discrimination cases could be considered a
revisiting of the issue of anti-discrimination by the Ninth Circuit, but at the same
time be considered a forward-looking revision of the circuit’s own previously
established level for protecting sexual orientation under Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection theory that takes Windsor and marriage equality advances to
something broader for sexual minorities.
SmithKline dealt with the dismissal of a potential male juror from voir dire in a
suit over HIV pharmaceuticals.146 During the interview of the candidate, his
responses made evident an easy inference that he might be gay through his
mentioning of a male partner.147 Based on this inference, the attorneys for the
defendant, pharmaceutical Abbot Laboratories, dismissed the candidate by using a
peremptory strike.148 Almost immediately, opposing counsel for SmithKline
Beecham made the inference from the strike that the candidate’s dismissal was due
to the candidate’s perceived sexual orientation,149 and challenged that strike based
on Batson v. Kentucky.150 However, unsure whether Batson prohibited a
peremptory strike based on sexual orientation, the court allowed the strike to
remain in effect.151 Trial continued and eventually concluded in favor of Abbott,
and SmithKline appealed on the basis that its Batson challenge should have been
sustained.152
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, this issue of whether this Batson challenge
would have precluded Abbott’s peremptory strike based on a perceived sexual
orientation brought forth an examination of whether sexual orientation was a
classification that fell under heightened scrutiny in equal protection.153 Although
Batson would have prohibited strikes based on race and gender, it was not known
whether such challenges could also apply to prohibit strikes based on sexual
orientation.154 However, Batson progeny proved helpful to direct the Ninth Circuit
in knowing that beyond race and gender, a Batson challenge would not at least not
prohibit a peremptory strike against a jury candidate based on a classification
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normally subject to rational basis.155 Hence, as the Ninth Circuit put it, “if sexual
orientation is subject to rational basis review, Abbott’s strike does not require
reversal”156 and an inquiry into the classification of sexual orientation in equal
protection would have to commence.157
In doing so, the SmithKline court also found that decades-old Ninth Circuit
cases applying rational basis to sexual orientation discrimination in equal protection
were already destabilized by a recent Ninth Circuit precedent, Witt v. Department
of the Air Force,158 that had interpreted Lawrence as requiring heightened scrutiny
for a substantive due process claim hinging on sexual orientation.159 Two prior
controlling Ninth Circuit cases over sexual orientation discrimination, High Tech
Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office160 and Philips v. Perry,161
cases that predated Lawrence, were presumably within the guiding signature of
now-defunct Bowers.162 This destabilization helped SmithKline deal with
Windsor’s silence because Lawrence and Witt gave the court the doctrine to
interpret that silence. Because Lawrence had also been quiet about the applicable
scrutiny level when it decriminalized same-sex intimacy on due process grounds,163
Witt developed factors to determine that Lawrence had used heightened
scrutiny.164 The Witt factors are: (1) whether there were the kind of post-hoc
rationalizations for the law in question that usual rationality inquiry requires; (2)
whether there was discussion of a legitimate state interest for justifying the harm
inflicted by the law in question as required by heightened scrutiny; and (3) whether
the level of scrutiny of the cited or mentioned cases in the analysis leaned in favor
of lower or heightened scrutiny.165 The interesting incrementalist observation here
is how the SmithKline court’s weighing of these factors also captured Kennedy’s
animus-dignity connection to firmly leverage a step upward toward heightened
scrutiny.166
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Animus and dignity concepts featured significantly in SmithKline’s analysis of
the first and second factors. The first Witt factor allowed the SmithKline court to
hone in on Kennedy’s finding and use of legislative animus for the passage of
DOMA to discount for any showing of post-hoc rationalizations of DOMA by
Justice Kennedy.167 Building off Windsor’s analysis of the legislative design,
purpose, and, lastly, effect of DOMA on same-sex couples,168 the SmithKline court
retraced Justice Kennedy’s study into the animus behind DOMA’s legislative
history and intent (notably paraphrasing that animus as “immorality of
homosexuality”) to conclude upon the “moral disapproval” that Justice Kennedy
spoke of in Windsor.169 Paired with the observation that Kennedy used this finding
of animus to demonstrate that the actual purpose of DOMA was “to impose
inequality, not for other reasons like governmental efficiency,”170 the SmithKline
court found that such unfavorable analysis toward DOMA could not sufficiently
evidence any post-hoc rationalization of DOMA in the opinion.171 In other words,
this is not the kind of analysis that would have evinced a typical rational basis
inquiry: “Windsor thus requires not that we conceive of hypothetical purposes, but
that we scrutinize Congress’s actual purposes. Windsor’s ‘careful consideration’ of
DOMA’s actual purpose and its failure to consider other unsupported bases is
antithetical to the very concept of rational basis review.”172 Actual purpose would
intimate heightened scrutiny rather than the deferential rational basis review that
could be supported by connections between a law and a conceivable, yet
hypothetical purpose; Windsor, as SmithKline noted, did not entertain
hypotheticals.173
SmithKline’s discussion of a finding of a congressional purpose fueled by
animus to justify DOMA’s differentiated treatment of same-sex couples in the first
factor also led to dignity harms that the court used to balance the second Witt
factor in favor of heightened scrutiny. The second Witt factor required the
SmithKline court to find a legitimate state interest to justify the harm that DOMA
inflicted on same-sex couples:
Just as Lawrence required that a legitimate state interest justify
the harm imposed by the Texas law, the critical part of Windsor
begins by demanding that Congress’s purpose “justify disparate
treatment of the group.” Windsor requires a “legitimate purpose”
to “overcome[ ]” the “disability” on a “class” of individuals. As we
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explained in Witt, “[w]ere the Court applying rational basis
review, it would not identify a legitimate state interest to ‘justify’ .
. . .” the disparate treatment of the group.174
By distilling Windsor through analysis of this factor, the dignitary harms that
Kennedy had drawn from the animus behind DOMA helped further the direction
in which SmithKline would complete its analysis of the second factor. Because
“[r]ational basis is ordinarily unconcerned with inequality that results from the
challenged state action,”175 the SmithKline court observed that
words like harm or injury rarely appear in the Court’s decisions
applying rational basis review. Windsor, however, uses these
words repeatedly. The majority opinion considers DOMA’s
“effect” on eight separate occasions. Windsor concerns the
“resulting injury and indignity” and the “disadvantage” inflicted
on gays and lesbians.176
What the SmithKline court read from Windsor was the lack of any mentioning of
a legitimate state interest that would allow a rational basis review to survive in
evaluating DOMA’s disparate treatment of same-sex couples, and such reading was
built upon Justice Kennedy’s identification of the dignitary harms DOMA imposed
upon same-sex couples in place of what the Supreme Court believed would have
been a legitimate interest that passed scrutiny.177 Citing Brown v. Board of
Education,178 SmithKline held that “Windsor’s concern with DOMA’s message
follows our constitutional tradition in forbidding state action from ‘denoting the
inferiority’ of a class of people.”179 For the SmithKline court, none of this
exemplified the use of rational basis in Windsor, but rather pointed to heightened
scrutiny.180 Inequality in and of itself in Windsor—i.e. the exclusion of same-sex
couples from enjoying recognized marriage rights—did not solely trigger
SmithKline’s upward ascent from rational basis to heightened scrutiny;181 only
when inequality is purposefully brought on by a legislative animus designed to
inflict dignitary harms on a relegated class is stepping up toward heightened
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scrutiny then possible.182 In this way, the SmithKline court relied on the animusdignity connection as it found for heightened scrutiny and as it made an important
distinction regarding the specific animus-dignity connection that Kennedy
fashioned in Windsor: dignity is possibly antithetical to rational review.183
SmithKline’s analysis of the third and last factor from Witt—whether Windsor
used a heightened scrutiny analysis because it cited and relied on heightened
scrutiny cases—was the weakest in the Ninth Circuit’s balancing toward
heightened scrutiny as Windsor cited to cases that used various levels of scrutiny:
Romer (rational basis),184 Moreno (a more searching form of rational basis that,
according to SmithKline, has been read in the Ninth Circuit as heightened
scrutiny),185 and Lawrence (heightened scrutiny, at least according to Witt).186 This
was self-propelling for SmithKline to say the least, but SmithKline attempted to be
evenhanded by reasoning that “[b]ecause Windsor relies on one case applying
rational basis and two cases applying heightened scrutiny, Witt’s final factor does
not decisively support one side or the other but leans in favor of applying
heightened scrutiny.”187 Yet with the other factors tipping in favor of heightened
scrutiny, a converse result that balanced this final factor the other way would likely
not have been fatal to SmithKline’s eventual heightened scrutiny determination.188
To initiate the upward leveraging of heightened scrutiny to evaluate under
equal protection a claim of sexual orientation discrimination, the SmithKline court
relied on doctrinal instability in the Ninth Circuit precedents regarding sexual
orientation discrimination.189 But once past this hurdle, it was Kennedy’s
connection between animus and dignitary harms in Windsor that became
significant for SmithKline’s actual leveraging.190 As a mediating principle, both
animus and dignity concepts helped dismiss any possibility that Windsor employed
a rationality review, pushing forward the Ninth Circuit’s doctrine on sexual
orientation anti-discrimination.191 Essentially, with Witt and Lawrence in the
periphery of the doctrinal framework of its analysis, SmithKline retraced Kennedy’s
animus-dignity connection in Windsor to justifiably reach heightened scrutiny
review for sexual orientation discrimination, elevating protection of sexual
minorities at least within Ninth Circuit cases.192 What resulted from all of this

182

See id.
See id. at 484–85.
184
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
185
See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 532–33 (1973); SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 483.
186
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 483 (citing Witt v.
Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 816 (9th Cir. 2007)).
187
SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 483.
188
See id. at 484.
189
See supra text accompanying notes 160–162.
190
See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 483.
191
See id. at 483–84.
192
See id. at 481–84.
183

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. I04

textual intertwining was enough room and momentum for the SmithKline court to
engage in an incremental development that resulted in saying, at least from the
Ninth Circuit’s purview, what remained unspoken in Windsor.
Of course other post-Windsor federal cases have not followed in SmithKline’s
footsteps, but stayed closer to a narrower, and supposedly exegetical reading of
Windsor—sometimes pondering, but always leaving intact and undissected, the
possibility that Windsor’s unspoken level of scrutiny was a heightened one.193 The
courts in such cases have been more restrained by doctrine.194 However, despite
using the lowest form of scrutiny for sexual orientation and sketching their pro-gay
decisions to conform closer within a cautious signature of Windsor rather than
drawing from a perspective that broadened the boundaries Justice Kennedy had
drawn, these courts still demonstrate incrementalism at work, making smaller
progress—but progress, nonetheless—in refining the reasoning within the current
doctrine of lower scrutiny in regard to same-sex relationships. In contrast,
SmithKline breaks out of that cycle—partly because of its non-marriage subject
matter, but also partly because it used animus and dignity from Windsor to justify a
broad reading that effected a different incrementalist reach, one that bears more
normative importance for the furthering of protections and recognition of sexual
identity beyond marriage equality.

B. Wymyslo and Suspect Classification in the Post-Windsor Marriage Cases
Soon after Windsor, a collection of federal same-sex marriage cases viewed
marriage bans as discriminating against sexual orientation then addressed such
discrimination by classifying sexual minorities as a suspect class and prompting
heightened scrutiny review; these cases would seem to offer another strand of
momentum in pushing the incremental progression of sexual orientation
protections further along.195 Similarly, these cases have reached as far as SmithKline
did in application, but validate heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation
discrimination in equal protection by using the animus-dignity connection from
Windsor differently.196 And similar to SmithKline, the animus-dignity connection
served to negotiate the doctrinal advances that were sought after.
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Other than the Sixth Circuit’s negative ruling toward marriage equality,197 and
district courts in Louisiana and Puerto Rico, which found that same-sex marriage
bans were constitutionally permissible,198 the large and fairly predictable consensus
in the marriage cases post-Windsor were predicated on the outcomes for same-sex
marriage in Justice Kennedy’s landmark decision overturning DOMA—whether
those successful outcomes were in the realm of substantive due process, federalism,
and/or equal protection.199 The repetitive successes of adjudication, case after case,
for same-sex couples in federal courts seems to be a recurrent theme. Many of the
litigants sued for similar recognitions under the same theories with the same uphill
battles against state oppositions, and most were resolved in similar judicial fashion:
by invoking or mentioning dignitary harms implications.200 This cycling back-andforth again exhibits the sequencing of trials and revisions from one increment to
the next in Lindblom, Weiss, and Woodhouse’s combined theory of disjointed
incrementalism.201 However, further critical and normative satisfaction can be
extracted from a more detailed study focusing on the differences between some of
these cases. Although most post-Windsor marriage cases advance the issue of
equality, only a handful of these cases—the ones that actually try to resolve the
issue of sexual orientation discrimination—truly and meaningfully help propagate
the legal recognition and protection of sexual minority identities outside of the
marriage context while using Windsor’s animus-dignity connection as a mediating
principle. One such leading example has been Wymyslo.202
Like SmithKline, some post-Windsor marriage cases that were unobstructed by
circuit precedents from re-classifying sexual orientation had the opportunity to
leverage up, but they declined to do so and often relied on Romer to qualify
Windsor’s silence on an expressed level of scrutiny used to overturn Section 3 of
DOMA. In the daybreak provoked by Windsor, such speculative opportunities
would seemingly prompt more daring courts to launch new doctrinal inquiries for
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firmer protections against discrimination for sexual minorities under equal
protection.
In Wymyslo, an early post-Windsor same-sex marriage case from a federal
district of Ohio that narrowly pre-dates SmithKline, plaintiffs’ challenged the Ohio
marriage ban as violating equal protection and requested that the court render a
decision under heightened scrutiny, prompting the court to classify sexual
orientation as a protectable trait under suspect or quasi-suspect classification.203
The court’s use of animus and dignity ran throughout the portions of the case in
which such elevation occurred.204 The plaintiffs in Wymyslo were surviving spouses
of same-sex marriages legally obtained outside of Ohio who had been refused
recognition of their marriages on their deceased spouses’ death certificates by the
state of Ohio.205 In seeking declaratory and permanent injunctive relief compelling
Ohio to recognize those same-sex marriages, plaintiffs sued under both the due
process and equal protection theories of the Fourteenth Amendment.206 In
preamble-like fashion, the Wymyslo court made clear that its position on both due
process and equal protection grounds direct Ohio to recognize the plaintiffs’ valid
out-of-state same-sex marriages on Ohio death certificates was taken from
Windsor:
This conclusion flows from the Windsor decision of the United
States Supreme Court this past summer, which held that the
federal government cannot refuse to recognize a valid same-sex
marriage. And now it is just as Justice Scalia predicted—the
lower courts are applying the Supreme Court’s decision, as they
must, and the question is presented whether a state can do what
the federal government cannot—i.e., discriminate against samesex couples . . . simply because the majority of the voters don’t
like homosexuality . . . . Under the Constitution of the United
States, the answer is no, as follows.207
Textually, the court revealed how it would read and apply Windsor by
appropriating and paraphrasing Justice Scalia’s sentiment to frame its present issue:
that the discrimination against same-sex couples was based on a dislike for the
inherent trait of homosexuality that these same-sex couples bore.208 A close review
of a footnote in the quoted passage qualifies Wymyslo’s mention of lower court
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decisions that relied on Windsor—especially with its citation to Griego v. Oliver,209
a post-Windsor state-level case from the Supreme Court of New Mexico that
applied intermediate scrutiny to an equal protection claim predicated on sexual
orientation discrimination to overturn the New Mexico same-sex marriage ban.210
But also just how profoundly the Wymyslo court extended—and how
incrementally further this extension is—from cases that hesitated to apply
heightened scrutiny can be observed in Wymyslo’s treatment of plaintiffs’ theory of
sexual orientation discrimination in Ohio’s same-sex marriage ban.211 Again, the
animus-dignity connection had a mediating role in bringing about this doctrinal
advancement.
Although in the earlier development in Wymyslo this ruling ultimately would
have narrow effect as an as-applied challenge upon just the litigants in the case, its
opinion and influence would eventually carry across other post-Windsor same-sex
marriage decisions. Interestingly, in the portion from Wymyslo on sexual
orientation discrimination on equal protection, the court inserted another extensive
preamble before weighing in on the actual merits.212 This preamble served as more
than the court’s throat-clearing as it unilaterally carved a significant precedential
line between what merits were about to be revealed and the sexual orientation and
animus decisions, Windsor and Romer, from the Supreme Court.213 The Wymyslo
court began with the recognition of same-sex marriages resulting from Windsor
and traced the equal protection theory used in Windsor back to the Romer decision
against Colorado’s Amendment 2, recounting particularly that Romer was a case
decided under rational basis on the issue of sexual orientation discrimination under
the Equal Protection clause.214 It seemed as if the Wymyslo court was about to use
Romer to also fill the silence left by Windsor on the level of scrutiny.215 However,
what differed in Wymyslo was the use of Romer in particular for framing the issue
around sexual orientation discrimination. While other cases used Romer
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predominately to match its application of rational basis in qualifying Windsor,216
Wymyslo pressed more at the animus against sexual minorities that Romer found
at the heart of Colorado’s Amendment 2’s passing, emphasizing in Romer’s own
words that the amendment had been a “status-based enactment divorced from any
factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state
interests; it is a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake.”217
Using Romer, the Wymyslo court also carefully connected the animus against
sexual minorities to the indignities that existed but were still nascent in Romer,
harms that Kennedy later sketched more fully in Lawrence. The Wymyslo court
highlighted a passage from Romer that described the effect of Amendment 2:
As the Supreme Court held so succinctly in Romer: “[Colorado
law] classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end
but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado
cannot do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger
to its laws. Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection
Clause[.]”218
At the time, due to Bowers,219 Romer might not have been as forthcoming with
what inequality did to the dignity rights of sexual minorities, but the Wymyslo
court’s next immediate line observing Windsor drew out what harms that a
comparable act of discrimination with a similar type of animus could bring about:
As the Supreme Court explained in striking down Section 3 of
DOMA, “[t]he avowed purpose and practical effect of the law
here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status,
and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made
lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”220
The same harm and effect that were merely “unequal” and that classified sexual
minorities as “strangers” to the law in Romer were now evident in Windsor—by
incremental shift, likely through Lawrence, though not mentioned by the Court—
and were revisited as “stigma” with negative dignitary implications. Focusing less
on rational basis, the Wymyslo court’s recitation of Romer and Windsor illustrated
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one way the Court was relying on Kennedy’s animus-dignity connection, while
setting up the analogy and impetus for its present adjudication.221 This connection
was what permitted the Wymyslo court to determine, at a threshold level, that the
Ohio ban differentiated between out-of-state marriages that were comprised of
same-sex couples and those that were comprised of opposite-sex couples.222 And it
is also the animus-dignity connection that the Wymyslo court observed between
Romer and Windsor that would then be emulated within issues of sexual
orientation discrimination the court similarly framed.223
In Wymyslo’s application of the factor test for determining protectable traits for
suspect or quasi-suspect classifications, the concepts of animus and dignity
appeared in various deconstructed incarnations.224 After destabilizing the Sixth
Circuit’s existing precedents that controlled the appropriate level of scrutiny for
sexual orientation, classifications under equal protection were not difficult for the
court in Wymyslo.225 The Wymyslo court, in a move reminiscent of SmithKline,
simply found that the controlling cases that read such claims under rationality were
all predicated on one progenitor case,226 Equality Foundation of Greater
Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati.227 Because Equality Foundation of Greater
Cincinnati relied on Bowers,228 the Wymyslo court seemed unimpeded from
applying the Supreme Court factors that would justify sexual orientation
classifications under heightened scrutiny.229 In doing so, it differed from
SmithKline, which never used the Supreme Court factors of suspect classification
in reaching heightened scrutiny appropriate for sexual orientation classification.230
But it also represents an incrementalist “spiraling up” within Step Three that was
made possible by the extensions of the animus-dignity connection afforded by
Windsor in staking new doctrinal ground. That connection was realized
throughout the Wymyslo analysis of the four Supreme Court factors determining
protected classes: (1) history of discrimination; (2) the ability of that class to
perform or contribute to society; (3) the political powerlessness of the class; and (4)
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the immutability of the defining characteristic of the class.231 As we will see, the
animus-dignity connection here both contextualized discrimination and at the same
time permitted the court to adopt standards against that discriminating context.
With historical discrimination, the first factor, the Wymyslo court’s finding was
premised on the historical anti-gay animus it highlighted from trial documents to
demonstrate the high probability of this factor.232 At the same time, the court ran
through a quick history of anti-gay animus to build a history of discrimination,
illustrating how the characterization of that animus changed from the version in
Windsor, which was mainly premised on moral disapproval.233 In doing so, the
court considered: (1) congressional bans of gay and lesbian travelers; (2)
Eisenhower’s executive order discharging federal employees who were gay and
requesting the firing of federal contractors who were gay; (3) examples of
discrimination from the U.S. military; (4) exclusion of sexual minorities from places
of business; and (5) a 2013 comparison made by Pennsylvania Governor Tom
Corbett between same-sex marriage and incest.234 The Wymyslo court’s version of
minorities in this observation was in some way a more menacing cruelty untethered
to a peculiar morality. It was a societal animus that, without moral justification,
however incorrect, seemed even more hateful and unnecessary. Although quickly
depicted, it was a secular animus that the Wymyslo court relayed with no lesser
impact than the kind of stigmatizing harm against sexual minorities. The way in
which the court described the acts here motivated by animus exemplified such
indignity. For instance, because of the animus within Eisenhower’s executive order,
private companies with federal contracts had to “ferret out” gay employees235 (as if
they were dehumanized, animal-like pests); or because of the historical animus
toward sexual minorities in the military, gay servicemembers were refused GI Bill
benefits and restoration of undesirable discharges and could still be criminalized for
sodomy.236 The animus is perhaps secularized, but these descriptions all still
resonate with the stigmatizing harm that Windsor had observed was suffered by
sexual minorities as a result of negatively differentiating them from the general
society through an animus-filled act.237 Of all of these illustrations provided by the
Wymyslo court, the worst (and most indignant) was the mention of the
Pennsylvania governor’s comparison that demeaned same-sex marriage by
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comparing it to incest238—and by doing so, also demeaned same-sex couples. Each
of these animus-dignity illustrations effectively helped the court to describe and
contextualize the history of sexual orientation discrimination.
In its analysis of the second factor—whether sexual minorities could be a
differentiated suspect classification because their specific distinction was related to
an ability to perform or contribute to society—the Wymyslo court found that
sexual orientation had no bearing on whether an individual’s performance or
contribution would be impeded or improved.239 Though a bit cursory, the court
accomplished this analysis in favor of sexual orientation by a comparison and
contrast of sexual orientation with other traits that might hinder societal
performance or contribution (age and mental handicap) and traits that would not
(race, gender, alienage, and national origin).240 In likening sexual orientation to the
latter grouping, the animus-dignity connection was exhibited in two places in the
court’s analysis. First, in dislodging associations between homosexuality and a trait
that could hinder societal performance or contribution, the court carefully and
specifically chose to differentiate sexual orientation from mental illness and placed
homosexuality as “a normal expression of human sexuality.”241 The court’s gestures
worked in tandem here, with one breaking away the negative stigma of
homosexuality while another accorded it a normalized connotation that in the end
“has no inherent association with a person’s ability to lead a happy, healthy, and
productive life or to contribute to society.”242 Essentially, the court dignified samesex sexuality in order to find no relationship to societal performance or
contribution.
The other place in this analysis that drew upon the animus-dignity connotation
was at the end of this second factor analysis, when the court concluded explicitly
that “sexual orientation is akin to race, gender, alienage, and national origin,”243 and
quoted the Supreme Court’s ruling in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc.,244 to note that those traits just mentioned “are so seldom relevant to the
achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such
considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy.”245 The emphasis
specifically added by the court to “prejudice and antipathy” drew upon recollection
of animus-motivated laws that have historically plagued other groups in a suspect
class (e.g. anti-miscegenation and racially-based laws), but could also remind us of
laws that have been at the center of recent marriage equality rulings, as well as
Amendment 2 from Romer.
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The Wymyslo court was careful in weighing the third factor, political
powerlessness, to not fall into the snare of thinking that this factor would not
balance favorably for sexual minorities because of their growing presence in society
and political achievements in recent decades.246 Rather, the inquiry was more
encompassing, asking whether sexual minorities had “the strength to politically
protect themselves from wrongful discrimination.”247 Out of the many examples the
court cited of how the law had not afforded direct political and legal protections for
sexual minorities—including mentioning the failed attempts to pass the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act248—an attempt to explain the causes of such
political failings allowed the Wymyslo court to include animus toward sexual
minorities in different forms, such as physical violence against gays and lesbians,
various types of hostility (public, political, and social), prejudice, and condemnation
on moral and political levels.249 Here was where the court used the animus-dignity
connection to explain away the root of political powerlessness for sexual minorities.
As the court exemplified in one instance, “violence against gay and lesbian people
engenders intimidation, which can ‘undermine the mobilization of gays and
lesbians and their allies to limit their free exercise of economic and social
liberties.’”250 The animus inflicted upon sexual minorities can then inhibit their
ability to access and exercise their rights with dignity.
Lastly, of these four factors, immutability is often the most controversial one for
sexual minorities as it parallels frequent societal and cultural debates about whether
the root of a person’s sexual orientation is nature or nurture—a biological one or
one based on choice.251 But with animus and dignity concepts as a mediating guide,
the Wymyslo court sidestepped that debate by adopting a different standard for
immutability, one in which the requirement “is not whether a characteristic is
strictly unchangeable, but whether the characteristic is a core trait or condition that
one cannot or should not be required to abandon.”252 This standard is a seemingly
“softer” one than a standard predicated on a trait that was biologically unwavering
and one that other marriage equality courts had recognized only recently prior to
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Wymyslo.253 It is a standard for immutability that also aligns itself better with the
animus-dignity connection. Although the Wymyslo court found that scientific
evidence was convincing that sexual orientation was biologically immutable, the
court was more interested in the concept of sexual orientation having both
emotional and biological aspects that stem from a person’s physical and sexual
attraction:
There is now broad medical and scientific consensus that sexual
orientation is immutable. “Sexual orientation refers to an
enduring pattern of emotional, romantic, and/or sexual
attractions to men, women, or both sexes. Most adults are
attracted to and form relationships with members of only one sex.
Efforts to change a person’s sexual orientation through religious
or psychotherapy interventions have not been shown to be
effective.”254
In fact, the court found it persuasive that “there is significant evidence to show that
interventions to change sexual orientation can be harmful to patients, and no major
mental health professional organization has approved their use.”255 Then the court
commented upon sexual orientation normatively: “Even more importantly, sexual
orientation is so fundamental to a person’s identity that one ought not be forced to
choose between one’s sexual orientation and one’s rights as an individual—even if
such a choice could be made.”256 The court cited to a passage in Lawrence on
privacy and personal intimate decision-making to imply the dignitary harms that
would implicitly arise if the converse were to happen—indeed the cost to sexual
minorities if they were forced to change their sexual orientations.257 Although not
explicitly mentioned, the court’s finding here about sexual orientation in regard to
immutability brings about the question: what would or could “force” someone to
change or choose involuntarily between orientations in a way that is harmful to
dignity? In the subtext of this court’s finding here, one implicit answer—but not
necessarily the only answer—would be an act of animus. After using the animusdignity connection to contextualize the etiology and the results of the
discrimination felt by sexual minorities, the court adopted a new standard for
immutability—one that addressed that context of discrimination while also finding
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sexual orientation conducive for suspect or quasi-suspect classification. Here, the
standard for immutability is not one that is closely tied to biological permanence,
but one that reaches through to personal, private significance that reflects
fundamental individual choice and autonomy. This standard for immutability
accomplishes this through the animus-dignity connection so prevalent in promarriage equality cases in the post-Windsor morning. One of the implicit
conclusions of Wymyslo is that law and (likely) policy can interfere with people’s
autonomy to make or force them to hide their traits.258 If particular laws and
policies, from a heteronormative vantage, can assert this pressure, then the effect of
interference is not only an example of “compulsory heterosexuality” on the
operational level, but also an example of what should trigger larger dignity
concerns.259 The question that this “softer” immutability standard raises to help
define a suspect classification is whether doing so would provoke the kinds of
personal dignitary violations recognized by Lawrence and Windsor, and thus, this
standard seems to prohibit compulsion. In effect, this is the mediation by the
animus-dignity connection that helps Wymyslo leverage doctrine at the same time
as contextualizing and narrating the discrimination of LGBTQ individuals.
Part III will elaborate on the substantial results of this mediation, but what is
helpful to note here, in understanding Wymyslo’s gesture to leverage higher sexual
orientation protection, is how animus and dignity were instrumental in both
humanizing discrimination and allowing the court to move toward a fundamental
approach in immutability to address the kind of concerns that discrimination raises.
All in all, it was the contours of the animus-dignity connection that helped craft
and bolster this factor in favor of sexual minorities in Wymyslo, and it was this
reasoning that induced another progressive increment for the protection of sexual
minorities within this Step Three moment. With that, heightened scrutiny in
Wymyslo was appropriate for sexual orientation discrimination under federal equal
protection, and thus sexual minorities became a protected class260—at least until its
reversal in DeBoer v. Snyder.261 The application of that higher level of scrutiny,
among other theories, settled the marriage recognition issue in Wymyslo for the
plaintiffs.262 In its own distinctive way, it seemed that Wymyslo was reinforcing the
original goal of sexual orientation protection that marriage litigation had been
premised upon.
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In sum, the animus-dignity connection facilitated the outcomes of SmithKline
and Wymyslo and prompted this furtherance for sexual identity within the law.
Part III of this Article will briefly explore and interpret the meaning of these
advances, particularly Wymyslo’s immutability standard and analysis and the
potential of SmithKline. Both provide promising developments for sexual
orientation beyond marriage if harnessed strategically and incrementally.
III. CHANGING WHAT’S UNCHANGEABLE: IMMUTABILITY & AUTONOMY
If one were to take a snapshot to memorialize that moment in the postWindsor dawn when both SmithKline and Wymyslo leveraged sexual orientation
into heightened scrutiny review under equal protection, the picture could have
easily located a bright and optimistic trajectory in marriage incrementalism’s Step
Three at the time. Yet, the trajectory that post-Windsor marriage equality cases
brought to the goal of protecting sexual orientation was more complex than merely
chasing an upward jurisprudential climb. The use of Windsor’s animus-dignity
connection in these cases and the continued regard for sexual orientation as a
protected class revealed a new significant development in the legal recognition of
sexual identities on the federal level: autonomy in defining sexual identity is key to
protecting sexual orientation under suspect or quasi-suspect classification. At this
point in the morning after Windsor, autonomy, as refined and contextualized by
the animus-dignity connection, has risen to become an animating idea behind
recognizing sexual orientation as a protected category in discrimination cases under
equal protection. Among other constitutional ideas in regard to sexual minorities,
this revelation has been what Step Three of marriage equality incrementalism has
helped jurisprudentially innovate.
One place to see this is in the way that Wymyslo regarded immutability for the
purposes of finding sexual orientation as a protectable trait. As discussed above,
animus and dignity concepts likely influenced the Ohio federal district court in
adopting this standard—a standard that was predicated on personal liberty. Not
only did that connection between animus and dignity serve as a mediating device to
contextualize the specific narrative of discrimination against sexual minorities and
also to broaden doctrine that addressed it, but the connection also exists to
negotiate essentialist and constructivist concerns in the standard itself to highlight
and protect personal autonomy interests in forming sexual identities. All of it was,
in turn, useful for convincing the court itself to think about why sexual orientation
was worthy of suspect or quasi-suspect classification in equality jurisprudence.
Although the Wymyslo court adopted an approach to immutability that seemed
to be a “softer” one (at least according to both Edward Stein263 and Zachary
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Kramer264), what seems “softer” is partly because immutable qualities were suddenly
no longer tethered to biology; rather they are dependent on a test of personal
liberty. Certainly parallels can be drawn between this recalibration of immutability
that is favorable for protecting sexual orientation and Justice Kennedy’s gesture in
overturning Section 3 of DOMA by finding that DOMA had hindered the
legitimacy and dignity of the personal relationship choices of same-sex couples.265
After all, Kennedy had highlighted that one of the reasons DOMA was able to
restrict same-sex couples was facilitated by a legislative animus premised on
biology.266
But there is some difference too from that perspective. What seemed “softer” in
Wymyslo’s immutability standard was something that helped move the court away
from prior doctrine that justified regulating sexual minorities through slippery
arguments based on anti-gay sensibilities that reinforced heteronormative
essentialism and, in turn, moved the court toward valuing sexual minorities’
autonomy. This standard for immutability is not a new one in federal courts. Its
application for finding sexual orientation as a trait for suspect or quasi-suspect
classification was imported from a line of asylum cases that notably culminated in
the Ninth Circuit case Hernandez-Montiel v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,267 which Wymyslo referenced.268 In Hernandez-Montiel, there was a
noteworthy valuation of autonomy in regard to viewing sexuality as immutable in
the way that the court specifically phrased that sexual orientation and identity “are
so fundamental to one’s identity that a person should not be required to abandon
them.”269 Hernandez-Montiel determined that sexual identity had a strong
physiological component,270 but then emphasized psychological and constructive
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components of sexual identity—personality, appearance, and dress, which are
reflective of orientation—as well as that it was also important to a person’s overall
identity, suggesting a volitional, expressive reaction to physiology that rounds out
the experience of sexuality.271 Interestingly, however, despite opining on how
“fundamental” sexual orientation and identity are to personhood in HernandezMontiel, the court never clearly or strongly articulated its sentiment into a standard
for immutability that values the trait of sexuality as one that ought not to be
changed, but instead left it implicit.272 Later cases, such as Wymyslo, drew the
sentiment of immutability out more explicitly.273
So again we see the importance of the animus-dignity connection in mediating
an outcome in which the Wymyslo court decided to use this “softer” approach, an
approach that protects autonomy, a trait that otherwise has been plagued with
nature-versus-choice debates. The narrative and experience of sexual orientation
discrimination, which the concepts of animus and dignity help illustrate, had its
role in justifying the adoption of a standard that regarded neither the importance of
whether being a sexual minority had a biological etiology nor whether it was pure
choice. The court was more concerned with how fundamental sexual identity is to
an individual’s existence and whether the answer to that question warrants the
highest equal protection.274
We see this shift in focus within the way the standard subordinates biology in
Wymyslo’s immutability inquiry. Previously, the rule that courts used to determine
the immutability factor had a larger predication on biology.275 This predication
manifested specifically in the requirement that the protectable trait had to be
something of an “accident of birth.”276 This focus opened the door for anti-gay
essentialist arguments. A predication on biology paired well with debates on the
root of homosexuality, and the existing scientific evidence that was too inconclusive
to declare that homosexuality was something based in the body led to a slippery
tautology that if homosexuality was not biologically rooted, then homosexuality
must have been a choice, and to choose in this way deviated from what
heteronormative values considered “natural.”277 This tautology, this assumption
about homosexuality, is incompatible with Frontiero’s rule that equality
jurisprudence shields constitutionally-protected classes from discrimination based
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on involuntary traits—in other words, traits that a person could not change.278
Moreover, this tautology led to anti-gay essentialism because the more it seemed
that homosexuality was not rooted in biology but was a personal choice against
dominant and heteronormative values, the easier it was to qualify anything that had
a relationship to the body—for instance, sexual conduct between same-sex
individuals—as degenerate.279 In contrast to being heterosexual, this choice would
be considered a bad one.280 Once that connotation was in place, the idea of being
homosexual as purely a personal lifestyle choice without a biological cause could
then be susceptible to disapproval based on moral or legal grounds281—in other
words: animus.
But with this standard that the Wymyslo court imported from cases that
evaluated religion and alienage as protected traits, the court’s attention was drawn
away from an inquiry about the significance of biology.282 This focus-shift is why
when the Wymyslo case talked about biology it could make a determination that
orientation was biologically immutable because that conclusion was no longer
relevant for debate. It could have cited to more scientific studies and written a
lengthy treatise on the biological root of sexual orientation and still in the end
reached the same conclusion that sexual identity is protectable. Instead, in regard to
orientation, the standard that Wymyslo used required only a distinctive trait that is
tied to biology, not in a causal way necessarily, but in a way that makes sexual
orientation and sexual attraction something involuntary.
Within Wymyslo’s softer standard for immutability, once the notion that sexual
orientation is involuntary was accepted, then the court’s preoccupation focused on
the individual and personal reaction to that involuntariness and how meaningful it
was to one’s identity.283 Whether or not the person reacts in a way that references
his or her sexual orientation is an act that reflects that individual’s personal
autonomy and one that the law should protect from interference. In this manner,
the debate between nature and choice was then recalibrated so that choice stood
less susceptible to denigrating arguments that lump judgments over the subject
matter of that choice with the ability to make that choice.284 The focus was instead

278

See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
See Graham, supra note 251, at 192–95.
280
See id.
281
See id.
282
See Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 692 F. Supp. 2d. 968, 990–91, 996 (S.D. Ohio 2013).
283
Id. at 990–91; see also Hoffman, supra note 275, at 1513 (noting this concept of immutability “is
sensitive to the importance of self-concept and embraces the idea that certain characteristics are core to
an individual’s sense of self”).
284
See Graham, supra note 251, at 173 ( “This alternative understanding of immutability expands
the concept for equal protection purposes, while also accomplishing two important goals: (1) it moves
past a fault-based model of immutability that generally seeks to exclude from protection groups whose
moral culpability or personal responsibility are the cause of their condition, and (2) it moves toward an
autonomy-based model of immutability that is premised on a respect for human dignity, which protects
critical constitutive aspects of personhood . . . .”).
279

20I5-20I6]

Once We’re Done Honeymooning

on personal freedom itself. Laws that interfere with the individual freedom to
choose something regarded as constitutive of identity would necessarily restrict
personal autonomy in a way that could marginalize, hide, or obscure sexual identity.
The effect of this would be stigmatizing or, alternatively, harmful to dignity.
This is a furtherance of Windsor’s realignment of essentialist and constructivist
concerns in laws regulating same-sex relationships. The shift is not simply one that
is moving from one end of identity theory (essentialism) to another
(constructivism). Rather, like Windsor, any shift in the axis that straddles between
essentialism and constructivism here is a shift from the anti-gay ideologies of both
essentialism and constructivism over to positive versions of essentialism and
constructivism that furthers the interests of sexual minorities. In choosing this
standard for immutability, Wymyslo strikes a middle ground—something Janet
Halley spoke of in evaluating the effectiveness of essentialist and constructivist
arguments in sexuality and the law.285 This recalibration is simple to see in the
standard because the standard abandons biological causation that could lead to
anti-gay essentialism and conversely takes up the idea of sexuality as something
innate biologically or something involuntary that, from the essentialist vantage
point, does not readily cast judgment but has more potential to broach a better
understanding of sexual minorities. At the same time, the standard transfers
significance from anti-gay ideas about choice and construct in being homosexual
that led from moral approbation and blameworthiness to ideas about sexuality as a
personal construct and choice that, first and foremost, reflects the value of
autonomy of the individual, but also has the effect of possibly characterizing the
identities of sexual minorities as positive reflections on humanity. The result of all
of this traversing is ultimately a conclusion by the Wymyslo court that autonomy in
sexual identity formation based on orientation is to be protected equally. Thus, the
reach toward immutability here contributes to the rise of autonomy that has
emerged in sexual orientation anti-discrimination since Lawrence and Windsor.
And the importance here is that autonomy under Wymyslo is not being raised
narrowly in the realm of same-sex conduct or relationships, but instead it is tied to
an explicit declaration of heightened scrutiny protection for sexual orientation.286
Herein lies the significant incremental development.
In the district court cases within the Sixth Circuit’s provenance post-Wymyslo,
the modified approach to immutability was continuously referenced in bringing
about marriage recognition for same-sex relationships, with all of them at least
reflecting and encouraging protecting sexual orientation as a suspect or quasisuspect class. Henry v. Himes allowed the same court from Wymyslo to revisit the
issue of heightened scrutiny and cement its prior ruling in regard to that level of
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protection for sexual orientation.287 Wymyslo was an as-applied challenge against
the Ohio marriage ban, and the litigants in Henry challenged the same ban
facially.288 But the results were no different. Citing Wymsylo for direct influence
and SmithKline for persuasive guidance,289 the district court was able to cling to
precedent to use heightened scrutiny in recognizing out-of-state same-sex
marriages under equal protection, indirectly validating its prior justifications of
using choice and autonomy to change the outlook on immutability.290
Only one case in the post-Windsor canon of lower federal district cases in the
Sixth Circuit did not examine sexual orientation under immutability in ruling
favorably for marriage for same-sex couples.291 But other marriage cases that shared
the same circuit as Wymyslo had their own respective levels of acknowledgment for
the Wymyslo ruling in regard to the new immutability standard. One federal
district court in Kentucky appeared less direct in following Wymyslo—at least at
first, when it visited the issue in Bourke v. Beshear292—and only acknowledged
Wymyslo and the possibility of suspect class protection for sexual orientation.293
The Bourke court declined to follow Wymyslo and was not willing to proceed any
further doctrinally from prior Sixth Circuit cases that had denied suspect
classification to sexual orientation.294 Yet the Bourke court did note that “a number
of reasons suggest that gay and lesbian individuals do constitute a suspect class,”295
including “immutable or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a
discrete group.”296 Subsequently, when this same court revisited the issue in its next
same-sex marriage case, Love v. Beshear,297 the court followed in Wymyslo’s steps
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by invalidating Sixth Circuit precedent that precluded heightened scrutiny and
then by applying the factor test to determine suspect or quasi-suspect
classification.298 In doing so, the Love court analyzed the factors fairly swiftly, but
paused at length at immutability, where again the standard for immutability was
altered from a firm standard that could have biological ties to one that reflected the
contours of Windsor’s animus and dignity concepts in order to underscore the
importance of individual choice and autonomy:
[S]trictly speaking, a person can change her citizenship, religion,
and even gender. Legislative classifications based on these
characteristics nevertheless receive heightened scrutiny because,
even though they are in a sense subject to choice, no one should
be forced to disavow or change them. That is, these
characteristics are “an integral part of human freedom” entitled to
constitutional protection, as is sexual expression.299
At minimum, the Love court’s analysis here merely redefined the standard to
reflect a leaning toward personal autonomy. But the borrowing of ideas from
Wymyslo to Love was also notice and affirmation of these preferences toward
autonomy. Moreover, like Wymyslo, the contours of the animus-dignity
connection appeared in Love’s articulation of the immutability standard. Within its
reference to legislation that regulated citizenship, religion, and gender statuses in
heightened scrutiny purview, the court likened sexual orientation, which is often
regulated by legislation that is based on animus, to traits such as citizenship,
religion, or gender and the court here cited to Lawrence to observe what the
Supreme Court had taken note of previously—that sexuality similarly resides
within a person’s identity so integrally that to force change, meaning to infringe
upon one’s personal autonomy, would implicitly result in harms to dignity.300
In the Ninth Circuit, discussions about protected classes and the broader
application of the immutability factor in regard to sexual orientation—with
autonomy in mind—were already underway. Although after SmithKline there was
a brief incremental pause with one federal district court case, Geiger v.
Kitzhaber,301 declining to follow SmithKline’s use and application of heightened
scrutiny to Oregon’s same-sex marriage ban, this pause was attributable to a
pending request by a Ninth Circuit judge for an en banc rehearing of SmithKline
that rendered the ruling not yet final and binding.302 Geiger nonetheless did
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overturn the Oregon marriage ban, but on other grounds.303 In the rest of the
Ninth Circuit, similar outcomes were taking place. District courts in Arizona
summarily determined their cases in favor of marriage equality.304 A Montana
federal marriage case, Rolando v. Fox,305 applied SmithKline very readily in its
equal protection portion,306 as did a later Alaska federal case, Hamby v. Parnell.307
In this way, SmithKline’s reach toward heightened scrutiny seems different
mainly because it did not directly touch upon immutability and foreclosed
connecting autonomy and immutability in the way Wymyslo did. But the Ninth
Circuit had already seen such factor analysis before in other sexual orientation antidiscrimination cases that led to similar autonomy considerations in both asylum
and marriage equality cases.308 For instance, Golinski v. U.S. Office of Personnel
Management309—one of the DOMA appeals simultaneously pending while
Windsor was being heard that was decided at the Supreme Court and then
subsequently dismissed as a result of Windsor—was a district court opinion that
analyzed the factors in favor of protecting sexual orientation as a suspect class.310
Particularly with regard to the immutability factor, the ideas of individual choice
and autonomy changed the standard for evaluating immutability to one that
evaluated sexual orientation as a trait “so fundamental to one’s identity that a
person should not be required to abandon it.”311 Here, the standard resembles
Wymyslo’s in emphasizing choice, and only the lack of Windsor’s animus and
dignity concept in the Golinski passage is noticeable. The court noted that the
harm would be “abhorrent”312 but without elaborating in any way that involved
dignitary harms the way Windsor did.313 Moreover, unlike Wymyslo, the reasoning
in Golinski also did not rely on Lawrence, but looked either directly at precedent
that pre-dated Lawrence314 or persuasively at cases that muted the dignity
implications from Lawrence.315
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Also, after SmithKline, Latta v. Otter,316 a post-Windsor marriage case from
the Federal District Court of Idaho, analyzed SmithKline’s adoption of heightened
scrutiny for sexual orientation discrimination under equal protection and noted that
such standard applied beyond animus and irrational stereotyping cases.317 Though
the Idaho district court did not evaluate the suspect classification factors directly, it
did refer to the Second Circuit’s analysis of the factors in its appellate opinion in
Windsor v. United States,318 which had rendered sexual orientation a protected
class.319 The Second Circuit’s Windsor decision did reflect autonomy in the
margins when it refined the immutability standard. That decision used a standard
that emphasized “distinguishing characteristics” in helping identify sexual
orientation as an immutable trait, but also disregarded the relevance of physical
changeability as something problematic to the definition of immutability,
footnoting examples with alienage and national origin that reflected how
considerations of immutable traits could involve the idea that “ changing it would
involve great difficulty, such as requiring a major physical change or a traumatic
change of identity.”320 Thus, the opinion indirectly valued personal autonomy:
“[T]hese characteristics do not declare themselves, and often may be disclosed or
suppressed as a matter of preference. What seems to matter is whether the
characteristic of the class calls down discrimination when it is manifest.”321 And so
when Latta arrived at the Ninth Circuit, a renewed application of SmithKline was
not hard to reach.322
What SmithKline did in breaking the door open for heightened scrutiny in
sexual orientation discrimination cases in equal protection was to allow that opened
door to usher in other decisions that might affirm and reflect the idea of autonomy
in immutability standards. Though the application of heightened scrutiny had been
explored in the Ninth Circuit, it was not until SmithKline (and also Windsor) that
there was any meaningful consideration of the issue that had precedential weight.
SmithKline’s significance was as an intermediary between those earlier cases and
the post-Windsor cases, using Windsor’s animus-dignity connection to rationalize
heightened scrutiny and in effect facilitate future sexual orientation discrimination
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cases that would latch onto an evolving view of immutability. Despite this
difference from Wymyslo, SmithKline still relied on animus-dignity concepts to
ultimately make heightened scrutiny available for sexual orientation discrimination
cases under equal protection in a way that emphasized autonomy—just not as
directly.
Thus, in the post-Windsor cases, following SmithKline and Wymyslo
progression up to heightened scrutiny, both Ninth Circuit and Sixth Circuit
marriage cases showed promise in taking that arrival at autonomy and
incrementally affirming, refining, or commenting upon it within the context of
Windsor’s animus-dignity connection. Despite the fact that progress was varied
from case-to-case and from circuit-to-circuit, that gradual progress is indicative of
incrementalist rumination as the cases seem more forward-looking for the rights of
sexual minorities in general. Even with the Sixth Circuit’s later reversal of
Wymyslo in DeBoer v. Snyder, the set-back could be something that appears to
incrementalist thinking as an event that does not warrant alarm for the eventual
progress of pro-LGBTQ protections—although in the short term it seemed as if
the reversal could appear damaging. We are in Step Three and not Step One after
all. All of this seemingly unstable back-and-forth has its place in the political and
legal evolution of the issue of sexual orientation discrimination. So far, it is what
this leveraging in the post-Windsor cases has arrived upon that matters most for
the rest of the metaphoric day after Windsor. The significant affirmation not just
about the law’s widening acceptance of sexual identity and its amenability for
placing sexual orientation at higher levels of protection in equality jurisprudence
bear attention. However, specifically there is even more significance in the idea of
locating sexual orientation as a fundamental component of individual personhood
by illustrating that harms of indignity could arise if laws otherwise continued to
interfere with the right for someone to engage autonomously in self-identification
based on sexual orientation. Part IV of this Article will comment normatively about
that development involving autonomy and what it poses for the challenges to sexual
orientation and the law in the future after marriage equality.
IV. OBERGEFELL V. HODGES: THE NEW AFTERNOON
In Ronald Reagan’s “Morning in America” ad, there was a key statistic about
the domestics of his envisioned America that reminded audiences of the lowered
inflation rate that his administration purportedly secured up to 1984.323 Although
one could argue that the point of observing that “6500 young men and women will
be married”324 later in the afternoon of Reagan’s metaphoric day was merely a
Madison-Avenue device for raising awareness of Reagan’s first-term economic
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accomplishments in his first term, the prolonged use of the traditional white chapel
wedding and the pastoral scenes, with the young opposite-sex couple kissing at the
altar before clergy and then leaving the chapel steps with rice being tossed above
their heads, could also be taken as a calculated re-enforcement of American family
values and norms at a time when social mores about co-habitation and families
were changing—and had been changing since the 1970s.325
Two decades later, after so many literal days in America have rotated
incrementally past Reagan’s 1984 campaign, the morning after Windsor is not
quite the “morning again”—as Reagan’s ad had portrayed its moment, preserving
retrospective norms326—but a morning anew that pushed forward into its
afternoon, with same-sex marriages now finally possible nationwide with
Obergefell v. Hodges.327 Because of Obergefell, the constitutional preservation of
marriage as a fundamental right is no longer just for those represented by Reagan’s
white church weddings. And while some state marriage schemes have included
same-sex couples, this afternoon with Obergefell must be an opportunity not to be
cabined by just the goals of marriage equality; it must also be used to focus on what
else the movement ought to do normatively for the protection of sexual identity
under the law.
Despite the Sixth Circuit’s reversal of district court cases that had reached
heightened scrutiny protection for sexual orientation, the same-sex marriage
movement progressed on to the Supreme Court.328 The reversal of DeBoer by
Obergefell329 further solidified Kennedy’s animus-dignity connection as an antistereotyping principle to combat discrimination against same-sex couples. But as
same-sex couples marry in this symbolic afternoon, one cannot lose sight of the
idea that progress does not end at the altar. As marriage equality was propelled by
the incremental strides in sexual orientation protection—i.e. decriminalizing samesex intimacy330 and making disparate treatment of same-sex couples unlawful331—it
should continue to further protections for sexual minorities. What has brought
those marriages to their legal inevitability should persist to meet larger purposes of
LGBTQ equality.
One of the earlier strategies in gay activism was to use marriage as a way to
protect orientation at the highest level.332 But in the post-Windsor cases,
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achievements in equality jurisprudence, such as those in SmithKline and Wymyslo,
that brought heightened scrutiny and protected classifications to sexual orientation
discrimination, are not as common. Instead, the majority of courts have merely
noted the Supreme Court’s silence on heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation in
equal protection and have reached marriage equality through rational basis review
or through heightened scrutiny, though only in due process theories that were not
based explicitly on sexual orientation discrimination—theories in which state
marriage bans were judged to infringe on the fundamental right of same-sex
couples to marry. Of course, each of these theories has furthered the rights of
sexual minorities. The fundamental rights arguments, for instance, have
perpetuated victories for same-sex couples in the context of the state’s recognition
of their marriages, and even for their families.333 Outside of the marriage and family
context, however, one wonders how directly pliable some of these doctrinal
successes can be for sexual orientation discrimination that does not involve samesex relationships or adopting children. In this sense, if sexual orientation antidiscrimination is not explored beyond the marriage and family context, we may be
slowing down at a ceiling that stops at marriage and same-sex relationships, and we
may lag in opening up to developments that further anti-discrimination as a whole
for sexual orientation.334
The observation above is a potentially disconcerting effect of Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion in Obergefell. The opinion, marking his fourth decision for the
advancement of gay rights rights,335 reversed the decision in DeBoer, the
consolidated Sixth Circuit ruling that had overturned federal district cases,
including Wymyslo.336 DeBoer had denied same-sex couples the right and
recognition of marriage through robust discussions under both the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.337 Although at the
Supreme Court the issues in Obergefell were also framed under the Fourteenth
Amendment to allow both due process and equal protection theories,338 Kennedy

333

See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601, 2604–05.
Introduction, Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation & Gender Identity, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 1682, 1689–90 (2014) (citing examples from the Netherlands and Canada which support a
concern that “once the marriage equality fight is won nationwide, the urgency of fighting for other
LGBT rights will diminish”).
335
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675; Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
336
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 421 (6th Cir. 2014) (reversing Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F.
Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013), rev’d sub nom. DeBoer, 772 F.3d 388, rev’d sub nom. Obergefell, 135
S. Ct. 2584).
337
DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 410–13 (discussing why the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
does not permit same-sex couples to marry); id. at 413–16 (discussing why same-sex couples lack a claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).
338
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593 (“This Court granted review, limited to two questions. The first,
presented by the cases from Michigan and Kentucky, is whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a
State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex. The second, presented by the cases from
334

20I5-20I6]

Once We’re Done Honeymooning

took an approach that located his historic ruling for the recognition of the marriage
rights of same-sex couples mostly within an exhaustive fundamental rights
analysis.339 In doing so, his decision upheld the due process rationales of many of
the post-Windsor marriage equality rulings in the lower courts340—but with
Kennedy’s own championing of basic human dignity as the social and legal impetus
for recognizing same-sex marriages.341 Kennedy identified and framed the issue as
whether to extend the fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples, and thus,
the first doctrinal part of the decision led with a discussion of the alreadyestablished fundamental right to marriage and how same-sex couples have been
excluded from partaking in that right under state laws.342 From this perspective,
Kennedy’s task was to justify the recognition of same-sex couples’ lawful abilities to
exercise the already-existing fundamental right to marry.343 This approach was
consistent with the position of the same-sex couples that served as petitioners in
Obergefell.344 On the contrary, all of the dissenting Justices in Obergefell—
Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—rejected this framing of the issue as an
existing fundamental right to marriage available to same-sex couples; rather, they
approached their dissenting opinions from the perspective that same-sex couples
were seeking to create a new and separate fundamental right to same-sex marriage
exclusively.345 Framing the issue narrowly in this way, the dissenting opinions were
Ohio, Tennessee, and, again, Kentucky, is whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to
recognize a same-sex marriage licensed and performed in a State which does grant that right.”) (citation
omitted).
339
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more easily able to dodge or deny notions of discrimination and more able to
expound more legalistically on the matter.346
However, according to Kennedy and the majority, withholding the right to
marry from same-sex couples did result in substantial and invidious discrimination
because such exclusion restricted personal choice and self-determinism,347
perpetuated a second-class citizenship,348 demeaned the families created by samesex unions,349 and precluded benefits of marriage accorded to opposite-sex couples
that otherwise were indicative of social order.350 All of this had led to the
deprivation of the dignity of same-sex couples. As Justice Kennedy summarized:
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The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have
seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central
meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest.
With that knowledge must come the recognition that laws
excluding same-sex couples from the marriage right impose
stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter.351
Once the fundamental rights issue was reached,—that indeed the basic but
unenumerated right to marriage encompassed same-sex marriages352—the equal
protection claim was resolved doctrinally and summarily by analyzing whether state
marriage bans discriminated against same-sex couples by impinging on their
fundamental right to marriage, rather than whether such bans discriminated against
same-sex couples based on sexual orientation or gender arguments: “Indeed, in
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has recognized that new
insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our
most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”353
Further highlighting that “unjustified inequality,” Kennedy found that “[i]t is now
clear that the challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and it must
be further acknowledged that they abridge central precepts of equality.”354 It was
hard to deny from that doctrinal vein within equal protection jurisprudence that if
marriage is a fundamental right available to those desiring to enter same-sex
relationships, then state marriage bans restricting in-state and out-of-state
marriages of same-sex couples are a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus,
because the Supreme Court did not have to discuss sexual orientation
discrimination directly in a discussion over tiered scrutiny or even within an
animus-focused reasoning as previously seen from Romer and Windsor, the Court
avoided the question.
The Court’s silence regarding a protected classification for sexual orientation
was even more pronounced in Obergefell than in Windsor. This silence made the
issue into an even bigger elephant in the room than when Windsor had applied its
animus-focused scrutiny, delineating that DOMA should be overturned because of
animus toward sexual minorities.355 Settling the issue regarding sexual orientation
in equality jurisprudence more concretely than the Supreme Court’s previous gay
rights cases was, and has been, in part the long-term goal in marriage litigation.356
For Kennedy to resolve the marriage issue without venturing into inequality based
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on sexual orientation was a seemingly short-sighted move that has frustrated
commentators.357 In addition, the silence seemed to ignore the clamor over this
issue from the litigants themselves, who argued back and forth on this in their
briefs.358 The silence bypassed several amici, who pointed out that marriage bans
could be resolved in the context of sexual orientation discrimination.359 It also
ignored the lower court rulings, including Wymyslo and DeBoer, both of which
had diametric holdings that relied on reasoning the issue of marriage
discrimination in equal protection with a determination of whether sexual
orientation deserved heightened scrutiny or rationality protection.360 Finally, in
regard to SmithKline, Obergefell’s silence consequently bypassed any potential to
discuss the validity of that case—leaving it untouched for now, but without the
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high court’s official blessing. In anticipation of the Obergefell ruling, there was
some consensus that “a decision applying heightened scrutiny would be an
unprecedented triumph for gays and lesbians,”361 and that “[a]n explicit decision
requiring heightened scrutiny would change things in an instant. It would hardwire
into the law—and our broader legal culture—the recognition that distinctions on
the basis of sexual orientation are almost always invidious and wrong.”362 That kind
of a ruling would have offered a new touchstone that normatively would have reset
everything.
In terms of Step Three of marriage equality incrementalism, Obergefell no
doubt fulfills the final step that Windsor had commenced. Yet the question
remains: what do the accomplishments of these three steps in this incrementalist
journey further beyond marriage equality? Despite the observation that Obergefell
fell short in finding protected class status for sexual minorities, Kennedy’s opinion
did leave some significant and very helpful developments in characterizing the
impressions and experiences of sexual minorities that in themselves incrementally
further advancement for sexual orientation anti-discrimination. The developments
may not be as immediate or as far reaching as hoped, but within the collective,
societal bounded rationality that needs to reach the social acceptance of sexual
minorities before legal acceptance can occur, the smaller developments in
Obergefell strike a slower progressive pace that comports with a more cautious
processing very indicative of incrementalist thinking. There may be some silver
linings after all.
Textually in Obergefell, Kennedy expounded on his previous motif of weaving
animus and dignity concepts together to further the marriage holding itself.
Because marriage equality issues incidentally precipitate larger legal issues regarding
sexual orientation—such as discrimination protectable under suspect or quasisuspect classifications—the import here of Kennedy’s animus-dignity connection
into Obergefell serves to also mediate forward gay rights advocacy. The animusdignity correlation helped Kennedy describe the equal marriage issues within a
narrative of discrimination against sexual minorities in law and society that allowed
the Court to continue a modernized regard for sexual minorities and transcend its
previous perfunctory and dismissive treatment of sexual minorities in Bowers v.
Hardwick and Baker v. Nelson.363 Despite not achieving the affirmative doctrinal
pronouncement that would place sexual orientation in a higher equal protection
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classification, the channeling functions of Kennedy’s animus-dignity connection in
Obergefell illustrated the anti-stereotyping possibilities that reflect a normative
change for sexual minorities beyond marriage. In Obergefell, the incremental
difference in Kennedy’s continued use of animus and dignity was not just in its
application in recognizing same-sex marriages federally, as it was more specifically
confined to addressing in Windsor. The difference was in how Kennedy illustrated
the broader application of the animus-dignity connection to the rest of the current
rights struggle for sexual minorities—particularly in the furtherance of personal
autonomy. This leaves future litigants in other contexts fertile judicial sentiments
for imparting reasons of how and why the experiences of sexual minorities have
been marked with invidious discrimination and for holding sexual orientation out
as a protectable trait without officially or doctrinally classifying it as such. The
three areas in Obergefell in which Kennedy did this occurred first, in his
historicism of the modern gay rights movement and his fundamental right analysis;
second, in the opinion’s actual Equal Protection Clause analysis; and, lastly, in two
very sparse but specific instances where Obergefell links up with Wymyslo in
regard to the immutability of sexual identities.

A. Historicism and Due Process
Kennedy began his opinion with sweeping historicisms on both the institution
of marriage and the modern gay rights movement, drawing resemblances in both
histories from a common theme that underscored how significant changes in both
have been brought about incrementally. As the two histories crossed over very
quickly to set the context for the same-sex marriage issue, we can see that this
entire portion between sections II and III of Kennedy’s Obergefell opinion, from
historicism to due process, was actually one carefully labored narrative that is bookended by animus at its beginning and dignity at its conclusion, with both concepts
mediating progress in the middle.364

1. Animus—After an introductory preamble about marriage and noting broadly
its “transcendent importance” through “the annals of human history”365 and how it
“is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations,”366 Kennedy shifted to the
exclusiveness of marriage, stating that all of these benefits and conditions of
marriage have only been open to opposite-sex relationships.367 Why is that so?
Kennedy quickly introduced the animus at the heart of excluding same-sex
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relationships in marriage practices, which he revealed as a pithy stance on an
adherence to tradition that conveyed an irony in the exclusion of same-sex couples
from what he had described as the vast, centralized condition of human existence
that is marriage.368 This stance on tradition seemed almost conclusory by the way
he articulated it: “That history [of marriage] is the beginning of these cases. The
respondents say it should be the end as well.”369 Kennedy depicted the respondents’
reason for excluding same-sex couples from marriage as a biased one: “To them, it
would demean a timeless institution if the concept and lawful status of marriage
were extended to two persons of the same sex. Marriage, in their view, is by its
nature a gender-differentiated union of man and woman.”370 Implicit within
Kennedy’s observation here was the rhetorical question: Why would legal inclusion
of same-sex couples “demean” the institution of marriage? Herein lies the animus.
Although Kennedy did not explicitly answer this question, the pattern of
marginalization from previous gay rights cases—Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor—
suggested that the source of this intellectualized stance is a hardened disapproval of
same-sex couples and sexual minorities. In Romer, Kennedy found that
Amendment 2 was promulgated by moral disapproval against gays and lesbians in
Colorado.371 In Lawrence, Kennedy hinted that animus was at the root of sodomy
laws in the later Twentieth Century.372 And from his inquiry into the House
Report in Windsor, Kennedy extrapolated and discussed at length the legislative
animus that created DOMA.373 Reading all these cases, including Obergefell, as a
tetralogy, all written by Kennedy, the subtext is clear that behind the
intellectualized stance against same-sex marriages is a long-standing disapproval of
sexual minorities, a view that might be held “in good faith by reasonable and
sincere people here and throughout the world,”374 but it is one that could not help
sustain the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry any longer.
By contrast, it was the petitioners—and by extension same-sex couples—who
had been “demeaned” by this intellectualized but animus-filled exclusion from the
institution of marriage. Countering that intellectualized version of animus,
Kennedy addressed the result of being excluded from marriage initially with the
deprivation of “its privileges and responsibilities,”375 but then more profoundly
through the deprivation of dignity when he immediately “recounts” personal
examples of exclusion from the petitioners in order to humanize the indignity from
animus.376 First, there was petitioner Obergefell and how he and his ailing spouse,
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Arthur, were forced marry inside a medical transport plane on a tarmac in
Baltimore, Maryland, because their home state of Ohio did not permit same-sex
couples to marry.377 Later, this same home state would not recognize their out-ofstate marriage even after Arthur had passed: “By statute, they must remain
strangers even in death, a state-imposed separation Obergefell deems ‘hurtful for
the rest of time.’”378 Kennedy also drew a sympathetic account of petitioners
DeBoer and Rowse, a Michigan lesbian couple who could not marry in their home
state, and whose unmarried status would jeopardize their parental rights over their
foster children in case “tragedy” were to befall either woman.379 Lastly, Kennedy
featured petitioners DeKoe and Kostura, a gay male couple who married in New
York, but whose marriage was not recognized once the pair settled in Tennessee.380
DeKoe had served in the military and had been deployed to Afghanistan soon after
the couple’s marriage.381 Kennedy observed the irony of the situation by remarking
how the couple’s “marriage is stripped from them whenever they reside in
Tennessee, returning and disappearing as they travel across state lines. DeKoe, who
served this Nation to preserve the freedom the Constitution protects, must endure
a substantial burden.”382
The indignity in each example was personalized—showing exactly the human
burden: the cost of exclusion, both legally and symbolically—and it stemmed
directly from animus that, by contrast, Kennedy personified within the respondents
as an impersonal and unsympathetic rhetorical question about why the law should
allow same-sex marriages.383 Whether Kennedy’s literary strategy here was heavyhanded or not, the structure of the animus-dignity connection helped him
demonstrate the invidiousness behind the exclusion—that from a longstanding
disapproval of sexual minorities in the law of marriage, real-life people have been
denigrated, and their relationships were kept in limbo. His message was clear in
Obergefell: philosophized animus based on mere tradition has long-lasting legal
and personal consequences that, as he was willing to show, are unjustified.
Kennedy’s historicism continued as he ventured into a narrative outlining how
the animus-dignity connection has mediated progress for both gay rights and
marriage equality.384 We see several of Lindblom’s incrementalist stratagems
exhibited in Kennedy’s version of recent developments in gay rights and marriage
equality history. First, Kennedy recounted changes to marriage itself, from religious
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to secular and finally, to something recognized contractually by the state.385 He
noted how the institution of marriage abandoned coverture when womens’ rights
and the stature of women began to change and “society began to understand that
women have their own equal dignity.”386 Such changes were the products of
bounded rationality, processing the nuances of marriage and how to comport with
societal changes: “These and other developments in the institution of marriage over
the past centuries were not mere superficial changes. Rather, they worked deep
transformations in its structure, affecting aspects of marriage long viewed by many
as essential.”387 Thus, bounded rationality might give hope to finding the exclusion
of same-sex couples from the right and recognition of marriage unnecessary:
“Indeed, changed understandings of marriage are characteristic of a Nation where
new dimensions of freedom become apparent to new generations, often through
perspectives that begin in pleas or protests and then are considered in the political
sphere and the judicial process.”388 Kennedy’s descriptions of change here resemble
Lindblom’s figurative journey of incremental changes in the political process.389
When Kennedy’s historicism of marriage transitioned to historicism of the
modern gay rights movement, it became clear that his recount of how the changing
status of women affected the doctrine of coverture in marriage was not merely an
incidental example of past evolutions of marriage. Instead, the overturning of
coverture was an example used to set up an eventual parallel to the current
evolution of marriage toward same-sex couples. In the meantime, this historicism
also set up an immediate parallel to gay rights developments, which have also
endured gradual social and legal changes based on evolving views on sexuality.
More profoundly for gay rights in Obergefell, the animus-dignity connection was
used in basically a short account of the Lawrence v. Texas issue in order to liken the
narrative struggles of sexual minorities in this historicism to that Kennedy’s
previous discussion on the animus that led to excluding same-sex couples from
marriage. Animus was behind such laws against sodomy: “[S]ame-sex intimacy
long had been condemned as immoral by the state itself in most Western nations, a
belief often embodied in the criminal law.”390 Moral disapproval brought about
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criminalization of same-sex sexual behavior, and, as a result, branded sexual
minorities as outlaws, a status that lacked dignity: “For this reason, among others,
many persons did not deem homosexuals to have dignity in their own distinct
identity.”391 However, this pattern of animus and indignity was not merely
relegated to sex acts; the theme of animus and indignity appeared beyond
criminalization of same-sex intimacy and had a hand in examples of discrimination
toward sexual minorities beyond privacy. Such animus was so widespread and
entrenched in law and society that it conflicted with notions “that gays and lesbians
had a just claim to dignity”392 and sustained the inequality and discrimination they
endured as they “were prohibited from most government employment, barred from
military service, excluded under immigration laws, targeted by police, and burdened
in their rights to associate.”393
But then views on sexual orientation changed. To demonstrate this transition,
Kennedy first inserted a quick summary of the transition by American
psychologists from categorizing homosexuality as a pathology in the 1950s to how
the mental health community now “recognize[s] that sexual orientation is both a
normal expression of human sexuality and immutable.”394 What had been an antigay essentialism has become an understanding that homosexuality perhaps
embodies both constructivist (“normal expression of human sexuality”) and
essentialist (“immutable”) notions that relinquish anti-gay attachments.395 In a
subsequent passage that reminds us of Eskridge’s take on incrementalism,396
Kennedy commented also on the changed visibility of same-sex couples that
coincided with improving public and political sentiments regarding “greater
tolerance” of sexual minorities.397 As a result, Kennedy suggested, “questions about
the rights of gays and lesbians soon reached the courts, where the issue could be
discussed in the formal discourse of the law.”398 Such discussion manifested itself in
the progress of sexual minorities under the law that carried the theme of dignity.
Initially, there was the Bowers ruling against sexual minorities with its affirmance
of sodomy statutes that potentially branded sexual minorities as outlaws.399 Then,
however, Romer shifted toward progress for sexual minorities by defeating animusfueled legislation that would have left sexual minorities in Colorado unprotected
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from discrimination.400 And finally, in Lawrence, the decriminalization of same-sex
intimacy countered that historical animus against such intimacy and championed
the dignity rights of sexual minorities by no longer allowing the law to stigmatize
them through consensual sex acts.401
Kennedy’s observation here also highlighted the spiraling changes of gay rights
incrementalism that brought us specifically into Step One of the Eskridge-MerinWaaldijk theory of marriage equality incrementalism,402 and it capped this section
of gay rights history as one that moved from animus of sexual minorities, which
was reflected and externalized in condemnation of an act that could be indicative of
sexual identity, to Lawrence’s judicial protection and affirmation of their dignity
rights.
Turning back to same-sex marriage, Kennedy’s next example of animus and
dignity was within a narrative that reflected some limited progress in marriage
equality litigation as a result of the correlative effects of the two concepts. Kennedy
described the past outcomes of the issue within the various judicial and legislative
bodies that were involved.403 This description not only coincides with the stratagem
in Lindblom’s disjointed incrementalism that characterizes the process as “[a]
sequence of trials, errors, and revised trials,”404 but it also continues to demonstrate
the mediating role that both animus and dignity precipitate in terms of garnering
progress for same-sex couples. First, Kennedy described the various significant
milestones in the journey of the marriage equality issue, notably in the state courts
of Hawaii405 in 1993 and Massachusetts406 in 2003 and DOMA’s federal enactment
in 1996 in between, which Windsor later vitiated.407 The post-Windsor cases in
federal circuits received mentioning and were particularly observed as having
adhered to their “judicial duty to base their decisions on principled reasons and
neutral discussions” by “writ[ing] a substantial body of law considering all sides of
these issues.”408 From one event to another, from progress and set-back and
progress again, the changing discourse in the law over same-sex marriages discussed
here exhibits the features of bounded rationality over the issue of same-sex
marriages—processing the issue in various venues, judicially and legislatively,
incrementally spinning between examples of animus and dignity. For instance,
Kennedy noted that DOMA had been passed by Congress over states’ “concerns”
about the potential impact of Baehr v. Lewin,409 which was another instance of an
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intellectualized animus influencing legislative restrictions on sexual minorities.
Similarly, DOMA was later defeated by Windsor, in part, through a redress of
dignity concerns: “DOMA, the [Windsor] Court held, impermissibly disparaged
those same-sex couples ‘who wanted to affirm their commitment to one another
before their children, their family, their friends, and their community.’”410
Only one slight deviation from Kennedy’s depiction of dignity triumphing over
animus exists in the opinion—but one that is later rectified by his fundamental
rights analysis. Within Kennedy’s historicism, the intellectualized animus toward
same-sex couples in marriage had not yet been completely overcome as, up until
this ruling, state marriage restrictions had still existed. Of course, this deviation was
also what had led to the litigation before the Court in Obergefell. As to the postWindsor moment, Kennedy noted that decisions at the Courts of Appeals were
favorable to same-sex couples and that “many thoughtful District Court decisions
addressing same-sex marriage” had followed in similar suit.411 And yet, all of these
various decisions were still a mere but growing consensus reacting to that historical
intellectualized disapproval of same-sex relationships. Other courts had weighed in
on the same animus against same-sex couples with some adherence to tradition.412
In essence, under Kennedy’s perspective, we have moved into a collective moment
where the animus-fueled restriction on marriage was no longer uniform, but rather
patchworked—as “the States are now divided on the issue of same-sex marriage.”413
But despite the favorable trend toward same-sex couples, Kennedy’s rhetoric carved
out the space for another incremental, albeit very significant, moment by
suggesting that there was nothing definitive for this issue—yet. Although this
description of the successes for same-sex marriage in the moment between
Windsor and Obergefell arguably downplayed the soaring momentum for same-sex
couples that actually transpired during that time, Kennedy’s characterization here is
an important dialogic precursor to his pro-gay fundamental rights rationale. In this
way, this slight deviation was not a deviation at all, but a description of the postWindsor morning that tied the cold, hard, and biased animus he explored at the
beginning of the opinion to the next part of his opinion addressing and rectifying
that animus through a Fourteenth Amendment due process rationale steeped in
dignity rights.

2. Dignity—Since Windsor, animus and dignity in Kennedy’s gay rights cases
have been more expressly exhibited as having a correlative effect. In Obergefell, this
effect was drawn out more openly through the animus-dignity connection as an
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anti-stereotyping principle. Upon establishing that a stony disapproval of same-sex
couples was at the core of keeping same-sex relationships outside of the
categorization of marriage, Kennedy moved onto redressing this exclusion by
articulating his analysis primarily via fundamental rights, the doctrinal vehicle that
allowed him to fully book-end this section of the opinion with the other spectrum
of his anti-stereotyping principle: dignity. He characterized fundamental rights as
facilitating “certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy,
including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”414 What then
followed was a set of four specific reasons, or “premises,” from Kennedy that are all
associated with dignity and that precipitated a fundamental rights application. For
example, the first premise that Kennedy gave related to how the restriction
impinged on the autonomy of sexual minorities to make choices that shape
individual destinies.415 Bound up in the right to marry are choices that Kennedy
believes “are among the most intimate that an individual can make.”416 The concept
of dignity figured into this association between marriage and personal choice when
the exclusion of marriage—already fueled by animus—purported to externalize the
sentiment against sexual minorities by enforcing the law in a way that categorized
their personal choices differently from the rest of society. Large sweeping tenets of
self-determinism were siphoned into the context of privacy, and suddenly Kennedy
revisited the identity politics of the bedroom that he had summoned in Lawrence,
except this time he noted the marital bedroom. Out of this first premise, it was
clear in Kennedy’s view that restricting same-sex couples from marriage infringed
upon their dignity because it affected individual autonomy that shapes personhood
and identity, an autonomy historically made available to opposite-sex couples.
Kennedy’s second premise also aligned with dignity, and had to do with the
expressive aspects of marriage on personal identity based on intimate association.417
The category of marriage itself is one that has been dignified by society and
honored, even in situations such as incarceration.418 Wrapped up in emotional and
psychological significance, marriage offers an existential self-definition: “Marriage
responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no
one there. It offers the hope of companionship and understanding and assurance
that while both still live there will be someone to care for the other.”419 By finding
that the fundamental right to marry applied to same-sex couples, sexual minorities
would have liberty to partake in this important associative self-definition;

414
See id. at 2597–98 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965)).
415
See id. at 2599 (“The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons together
can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality. This is true for all persons,
whatever their sexual orientation.”) (citing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693–95 (2013)).
416
Id. at 2599 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003)).
417
Id.
418
Id. at 2599–600 (discussing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987)).
419
Id. at 2600.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. I04

otherwise, they would have continued to be outcasts from this universal
institution.420
In his third premise for allowing same-sex couples to marry under fundamental
rights, Kennedy focused on the children and families affected by the exclusion of
same-sex couples from the institution of marriage and the indignities that had
arisen from that exclusion.421 This passage reflects the law’s changing attitudes
about same-sex parenting, equating same-sex couples with opposite-sex couples on
ability to rear children.422 Then the dignity-rights impact—a common theme in
Windsor and the post-Windsor lower courts—emerged in Kennedy’s observation
that “[w]ithout the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their
children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser. . . . The
marriage laws at issue here thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex
couples.”423 Other than the dignity-rights implications for families anchored by
same-sex unions, the interesting thought here was how Kennedy debunked one of
the original main premises for excluding same-sex couples: procreation. Unlike the
way in which the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker v. State424 famously discredited
the procreation reasoning when it ruled that same-sex couples were entitled to civil
unions,425 Kennedy did not weigh in on the biology of it all. Instead, he
restructured the argument to focus on the creation of families, biological or not,426
and de-emphasized the importance of biology: “An ability, desire, or promise to
procreate is not and has not been a prerequisite for a valid marriage in any State . . .
. The constitutional marriage right has many aspects, of which childbearing is only
one.”427 What was once a powerful presumption about marriage—procreation—was
relegated to just one reason for marriage, but not the only one. Rather, it is the
familial situation created by same-sex parents and children that beckons the right
of marriage. The slight shift in perspective is another example of legal thought on
this issue moving away from anti-gay essentialism and toward a more neutral
position between the biology and construct of families. This shift seemed to parallel
the change in the conversation over sexual orientation immutability in Wymyslo,
where the issue was no longer a debate over nature versus choice, but rather over
the essential function of sexual identity in one’s personhood and autonomy.
The last premise found indignity by the inferences reasonably drawn from the
deprivation of rights and benefits that this exclusion from marriage created despite
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there being “no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples.”428 In
categorizing the harm suffered by same-sex couples from being “denied the
constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage,”429 Kennedy
reached for “more than just [the] material burdens” and characterized the level of
harm as a societal one—an “instability many opposite-sex couples would deem
intolerable in their own lives.”430 According to Kennedy, through the attachment of
certain rights and benefits, marriage is an institution that engenders a particular
status within a societal hierarchy for those allowed to participate.431 Excluding
same-sex couples from it through the denial of those rights, in part, demoted and
demeaned real-life same-sex couples and same-sex relationships in general.432 Both
rights and benefits have material and symbolic value, enough to impose stigma and
to damage dignity without it.

3. Anti-stereotyping—The fundamental rights section of Obergefell, where
Kennedy discussed the indignities created by excluding same-sex couples from
marriage, symbolically book-ended and redressed the lengthy historicism where
animus toward same-sex couples appeared as the root of marriage inequality and
the ultimate denial of dignity. All four “premises,” or reasons why Kennedy found
that the fundamental right to marry is applicable to same-sex couples, drew upon
the deprivation of human dignity on various levels to justify the ruling that the
right to marry should not be excluded from same-sex relationships. As a set, they
were juxtaposed against that prejudicial animus against same-sex couples to serve
two important purposes that both demonstrate the animus-dignity connection as
an anti-stereotyping principle.
First, the four premises helped continue to establish the correlation between
animus and dignity—building upon the connection Kennedy made in his previous
gay rights rulings and examples. We see this correlation literally when Kennedy
illustrated it at the end of his due process analysis when he recapitulated that
intellectualized animus: “[M]any who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach
that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical
premises.”433 Such “conclusions” are the same as those reached by philosophy or
religion in ways that make people question if the inclusion of same-sex couples
would “demean” the institution of marriage; in other words, the conclusions and
premises manifested intellectualized animus toward sexual minorities and their
relationships. The constitutional problem occurred “when that sincere, personal
opposition [became] enacted law and public policy, [and] the necessary
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consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon
demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied.”434 The exclusion
of the right to marry was both caused by animus and resulted in indignity of a kind
that had be redressed.
The second significance of setting up animus and dignity together was to show
the injustice that resulted from that correlation in regard to the rights of same-sex
couples. Against an animus that appeared intellectualized, hollow, and pithy
because it adhered to exclusion for no other apparent reason but tradition, Kennedy
demonstrated that the significance of excluding same-sex couples from the right to
marriage meant that “it would disparage their choices and diminish their
personhood.”435 Normative ideals about autonomy and self-determination available
to opposite-sex couples but not same-sex ones are linked through the ability to
marry to create a sense of dignity, whether through the status that marriage confers
or the rights attached to marriage. In the face of such animus, a decision to
continually perpetuate it would create overwhelming personal costs to the liberty,
autonomy, and self-determination of sexual minorities in a way that not only
seemed unnecessary, but also unjustified and harmful enough to violate our
constitutional ideals. This was ultimately how the animus-dignity connection
operated as an anti-stereotyping principle in Obergefell.
Thus, Kennedy’s animus-dignity connection in sections II and III of Obergefell
mediated, as an anti-stereotyping principle, the significance of marriage restrictions
in order to elevate the issue as one that infringed upon the constitutional rights of
same-sex couples to marry. On one hand, illustrations of indignity contextualized
the inequality and marginalization of same-sex couples within the marriage issue.
But within the rights and benefits that were unavailable to same-sex couples, which
externalized this inequality and marginalization, we can also see that exclusion of
marriage denied same-sex couples important aspects of liberty that resonate with
self-expression, self-definition, and personhood. Through this connection between
animus and dignity, Kennedy made a ruling that demonstrated inequality without a
tiered-scrutiny analysis, but on a functional level, he also rectified that tradition of
animus and exclusion through furthering the autonomy of same-sex individuals in
the marriage context using fundamental rights. This furtherance of autonomy, as
we will see, is another important incremental step in the advancement of the rights
and protections of sexual minorities.

B. Equal Protection
Whereas, with the due process analysis in Obergefell, the animus-dignity
connection appeared in the narrative structure of the opinion largely to allow
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Kennedy to humanize indignities and mediate toward his fundamental rights
ruling, the animus-dignity connection was used more subtly in Kennedy’s equal
protection analysis. After a preamble in which he discussed the mediating
principles of both the liberty and equality concepts together under the Fourteenth
Amendment436 and excerpted examples from other cases, such as Loving v.
Virginia,437 Zablocki v. Redhail,438 and Lawrence,439 Kennedy arrived at the heart of
his equality analysis. He analyzed the issue, not in a tiered-scrutiny analysis
involving traits, but rather from a doctrinal requirement that because the
fundamental right to marriage applies to same-sex couples, the equal protection
analysis should view whether there had been any impingement of that right against
same-sex couples through state marriage bans.440 On the surface, “marriage laws
enforced by the respondents are in essence unequal [because] same-sex couples are
denied all the benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples and are barred from
exercising a fundamental right.”441 Essentially this reasoning was how Kennedy got
around a suspect classification analysis, through a mediation of the due process
issue as he attempted to evaluate its equal accessibility to both same-sex and
opposite-sex couples. Marriage laws against same-sex unions thwarted that equality
and had to necessarily be undone. Here was where the animus-dignity connection
again emerged—as an ancillary reason noted by Kennedy that further pushed or
validated his previous findings in his due process section in Obergefell. He drew
out a connection between animus and dignity that underscored the urgency of this
inequality: “Especially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships,
this denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and continuing
harm.”442 Again, Kennedy contextualized and historicized the inequality of samesex couples under traditional marriage laws, conjuring up again the animus toward
same-sex couples and showing the result of that animus, which eventually
externalized into dignitary harm that sexual minorities had faced: “The imposition
of this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them.”443
Unequal treatment both denied same-sex couples the rights and benefits of
marriage and cabined sexual minorities from personal choices and liberties enjoyed
by the majority.
The equal protection issue could have been resolved on the doctrine alone, but
the use of the animus-dignity connection here drew out the discriminatory effect of
that inequality and was used to humanize the specific nature of marriage inequality
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among the states. In addition, the use of animus and dignity reiterated the kind of
harms that Kennedy discussed previously in Obergefell under due process—harms
that encompassed not only loss of material aspects (rights and benefits) but also
infringement of personhood liberties (privacy and autonomy) and social
stigmatization linked to animus toward sexual orientation and that encroached
upon dignity. Although a determination based on sexual orientation and perhaps
heightened scrutiny likely would have been preferred, the more cursory equal
protection analysis here has a silver lining, as it serves to highlight Kennedy’s
previous rationale in fundamental rights. What Kennedy’s opinion did in its
analysis under the impingement of fundamental rights, whether this was his
intention or not, highlighted the previous section’s emphasis on liberty, made
salient through discussions of indignity suffered by same-sex couples when state
marriage bans curtailed their rights to personal choice and autonomy. In this way,
Kennedy’s equal protection analysis also redressed exclusion from marriage through
an affirmance of personal autonomy.

C. Immutability
The last important development in Obergefell that offers an incremental “stepup” for sexual orientation anti-discrimination, in lieu of elevating sexual orientation
to quasi-suspect or suspect classification, is surprisingly in Kennedy’s identification
of sexual orientation as an immutable trait. Unlike Wymyslo, the Obergefell
opinion, in comparison, mentioned immutability of sexual orientation only in
mercurial—nearly incidental—fashion. However, such fleeting incidence does not
diminish its importance as a significant advancement for sexual minorities. Instead,
Kennedy’s observation that sexual orientation is immutable could be likened to
Wymyslo’s adoption of previous redefinitions of immutability that eventually led to
the classifying of sexual orientation as quasi-suspect or suspect and relied on a
connection between animus and dignity—where the inquiry was recalibrated from
a finding based on the source of sexual orientation to how fundamental sexual
identity is as part of personhood. The connection between immutability in
Obergefell and Wymyslo has been facilitated by the animus-dignity connection in
both opinions.
In Obergefell, the two instances where Kennedy mentioned the immutability of
sexual orientation occurred in his historicism early on in the opinion. First,
Kennedy raised the immutability of sexual orientation at the start of his historicism
section just as he voiced the respondent’s cold, hard intellectualized disapproval—
that animus—toward same-sex couples.444 Beyond the rights and benefits conferred
in marriage, immutability was a secondary reason why same-sex couples should be
allowed the freedom to marry. Other than the need for same-sex couples to receive

444

See id. at 2594.

20I5-20I6]

Once We’re Done Honeymooning

the “privileges and responsibilities”445 of marriage under the law, “their immutable
nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path to this profound
commitment.”446 Without entering into as elaborate an analysis as the one required
and taken by the Wymyslo court, Kennedy suggested at least two important
sentiments regarding the immutability of sexual orientation: one, that sexual
orientation is unchangeable and unwavering; and two, that this immutability is one
underlying reason to abolish marriage restrictions and finally permit same-sex
couples to marry in all states. In other words, the immutability of sexual orientation
was so strong and essential that Kennedy used it to counter the historical animus
toward same-sex couples and reveal the exclusion as something animated by severe,
but hollow, prejudice. Immutability was used to show how ironically the laws
against same-sex marriage produced an injustice by working an artificiality—a legal
fiction—that deprived same-sex couples the autonomy to choose how to identify
their relationships and to exert the fundamental nature of their sexual identity.
Ultimately, in Kennedy’s view, such deprivation would lead to the indignities he
discussed in his due process analysis.447 This interpretation also shares overlap with
Lawrence, as the privacy and autonomy issues in that case were linked to the
expression of sexual identity and the marginalization of sexual identity through
sodomy laws.448 At the same time, Kennedy’s use of immutability to denote the
nature of sexual orientation also resembled the overall functional definition of
immutability from the Wymyslo decision that had led similarly to an idea that it is
something basic and fundamental to a person’s self-determinative core.449
Kennedy made a second mention of the immutability of sexual orientation
when he narrated the changing views on homosexuality and sexual orientation by
the U.S. psychiatric and medical community over the past several decades. Initially
categorizing homosexuality as a “mental disorder” in the 1950s, the same
professional community now “recognize[s] that sexual orientation is both a normal
expression of human sexuality and immutable.”450 Here, “immutable” imbues sexual
identity with unwavering characteristics that are also universal—negating both
connotations of biological pathology and morally blameworthy choice. Although
Kennedy was citing to the amicus brief filed by the American Psychological
Association,451 this passing mention of immutability did not seem to be merely an

445

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
447
See id. at 2597–2605.
448
See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
449
See Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 990–91 (S.D. Ohio 2013), rev’d sum nom.
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 420–21(6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
450
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 (referring to the Brief of the American Psychological Ass’n et al.
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 7–17, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562,
14-571, 14-574)).
451
See Brief of the American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
7–17, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574).
446

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. I04

observation he was specifically affixing to amici psychiatric professionals, but rather
an observation about the nature of sexual orientation that he seemed to endorse.
This second mentioning of sexual orientation and immutability was immediately
followed by Kennedy’s own notice of the growing and positive visibility of same-sex
relationships and families and served as a rhetorical transition toward bolstering
changed sentiments about sexual minorities that he ultimately used to leverage his
pro-gay ruling on fundamental rights.452 At the same time, the unwavering
characteristic of sexual orientation again supported reasons why orientation is so
fundamental to one’s identity that the law ought not to force one to change or
curtail it because to do so would violate autonomy rights connected to selfdeterminism and personhood and lead to gross societal indignities. Thus, this use
and mention of immutability also resembled Wymyslo’s, and was well-suited for
addressing the marriage discrimination issue here within Kennedy’s animus-dignity
connection. However, going forward, this mention could carry a larger resonance
for addressing sexual orientation discrimination further.453
Short of a full treatment of sexual orientation as a trait deemed for quasisuspect or suspect classification using the factor-test as Wymyslo did, both
instances where Kennedy discussed sexual orientation as an immutable trait appear
consistent, or, at least, compatible with Wymyslo’s result. The brief observations
here in Obergefell that support the immutability of sexual orientation take on the
idea that this inquiry has become a non-issue—at least in the mind of Kennedy,
and perhaps with the rest of the Obergefell majority. The short but declarative way
in which the opinion depicted the immutability of sexual orientation seemed as if
the majority was taking judicial notice that sexual orientation is a basic and
fundamental part of human identity that should not be easily abridged by the law.
Additionally, the mention of immutability in Obergefell is connected to concepts
of animus and dignity that are working together as an anti-stereotyping principle
here, as well as in Wymyslo. This is where important ideas converged in
Obergefell—where immutability and the anti-stereotyping principle in Kennedy’s
animus-dignity connection have united for future leveraging of rights issues of
sexual minorities. Although immutability was not used explicitly here in an analysis
for heightened scrutiny, it nonetheless has the resonance to reinforce a connotation
that sexual orientation deserves higher constitutional protections.
In sum, despite falling short of an equality analysis that would have launched
sexual orientation protection under heightened scrutiny review, the three ways in
which Kennedy used the animus-dignity connection in reaching his fundamental
rights holding, in ruling on equal protection, and in noting the immutability of
sexual orientation all serve as increments for pushing forward the progressive views
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of sexual orientation within the law. In this afternoon of same-sex marriages made
possible by Obergefell, this progress—especially in each instance’s furtherance of
personal autonomy of sexual minorities—is not merely as small or insignificant as it
seems.
Future litigation concerning sexual orientation discrimination ought to capture
and use these incremental developments from post-Windsor cases such as
Wymyslo and Obergefell that strengthen legal perceptions regarding the trait of
sexual orientation for the purposes of constitutional protection. They should
continue to use animus and dignity together to impart a cohesive context of
discrimination and to reframe the discussion of sexual orientation immutability that
persuasively captures the struggles of sexual minorities and leverages further
advances in anti-discrimination. This is what the afternoon with Obergefell and
same-sex marriages have brought us.
V. POST-OBERGEFELL: WHAT THE EVENING POTENTIALLY HOLDS
When juxtaposed with SmithKline and Wymyslo, Obergefell appears more
restrained in its underlying ideology of elevating the protection of sexual minorities
to heightened scrutiny. The two lower cases provided major steps in recognizing
sexual orientation as a quasi-suspect or suspect class, while the Supreme Court
decision, however historically important, dodged the issue by choosing to base its
recognition of same-sex marraige on fundamental rights theory. Nevertheless,
despite its normative shortcoming for the equal protection of sexual orientation,
Obergefell, with both Kennedy’s perpetuation of the animus-dignity connection as
an anti-stereotyping principle and its incremental furtherance of the autonomy
rights of sexual minorities, still offers jurisprudential significance.
As an anti-stereotyping principle, the animus-dignity connection serves as a
vehicle to contain the narrative of discrimination and marginalization based on
sexual orientation. Rhetorically, it identifies the disapproval of sexual minorities,
shows how such disapproval manifests into legal and political maneuvers against
them, and illustrates the humanity-based grievances endured by them as a result.
The animus-dignity connection accessibly frames the marginalization of sexual
minorities as a narrative of discrimination that can be conceivably used beyond the
marriage context—and even beyond sexual orientation discrimination generally.
The connection between animus and dignity humanizes history and experience for
substantial judicial redress. Harnessed together by Kennedy for his fourth gay
rights opinion at the Supreme Court, the animus-dignity connection in Obergefell
arrived at the marriage equality ruling. Yet more importantly, by tying the
significance of the marriage right to human dignity, Kennedy was able to voice
saliently that the right to marriage should be legally available to same-sex couples
because otherwise it bears harmful implications for deep constitutional ideals.
Specifically in Obergefell, Kennedy’s continuous use of and reliance on the animusdignity connection reveals an emphasis on the autonomy of sexual minorities.
Abridging the personal autonomy harbored within a fundamental right is
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something that many of the gay rights cases discussed in this Article have had as a
common theme. As Kennedy noted in Obergefell, “the Constitution contemplates
that democracy is the appropriate process for change, so long as that process does
not abridge fundamental rights.”454 In this way, autonomy is applicable outside of
marriage.
Such underlying implications in Obergefell consequently place SmithKline and
Wymyslo somewhat in alignment. After all, under SmithKline and Wymyslo, the
potential increase in recognizing autonomy was already a major incremental step in
raising the level of federal protection against sexual orientation discrimination—not
just because it facilitated leveraging toward suspect classification, but because such
recognition bolstered and developed constitutional ideas regarding privacy and
individual personhood in the realm of sexual identity into actual doctrine. The
courts there were not engaged in an over-simplified debate about essentialism
versus constructivism; they were not venturing into the nature-versus-nurture
discussion over sexuality in popular culture. The refinement of the issue into one
regarding autonomy—starting from a fault-based, biological emphasis to a focus on
involuntariness and finally fundamental personal choice—illustrates how consensus
is not needed over the biological source of sexual orientation, but is needed about
how individuals respond to that biology in a way that should also not be
encroached upon by involuntary coercion (perhaps based in animus or otherwise)
that leads to violations of human dignity. From an incrementalist perspective,
SmithKline and Wymyslo were not concerned primarily with theories of identity,
but rather, in the long haul, with affording justice. They did so by attempting to
safeguard individual and personal autonomy, and their shift to higher doctrine
served as means to pursue these ends. In its various ways of underscoring the
importance of autonomy using the animus-dignity connection, Obergefell concurs.
One of the ultimate leveraging advancements from the recent marriage cases,
post-Windsor to Obergefell, should be an increased recognition between personal
autonomy and sexual identity. Autonomy, after all, resides significantly in modern
theories of democratic rights because individualism and self-determinacy has
figured into the concept of humanity. Eric Mitnick, in rendering his concept of
“constitutive autonomy,” notes how political philosophers—Joseph Raz and John
Stuart Mill, among others—have idealized autonomy in regard to an individual’s
creation of the self and that not having such autonomy would subvert an
individual’s humanity.455 “In this sense,” Mitnick writes, “liberalism envisions
individual constitutive autonomy as essential to the fulfillment of basic human
dignity. Exercising constitutive autonomy, on this view, is what it means to be free,
to be human.”456 Relating all of this back to sexual orientation anti-discrimination,
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autonomy helps leverage advances within equality, because inequality here is still
concerned with the distribution of rights—even if the right involves something as
intangible as self-determinism but is externalized by personal choice.457 In that
sense, Wymyslo’s immutability standard, specifically, and SmithKline’s leveraging
of heightened scrutiny, contextually, should have the potential to contribute
towards expanding protections for sexual minorities. Henceforth, the developments
in the post-Windsor morning, up to the afternoon with Obergefell, must serve
legal purposes beyond furthering the legal protections and recognitions of same-sex
relationships. They ought to be expanded for sexual identity in the LGBTQ
movement’s next increment of advancement.
Although American anti-discrimination law—as represented emblematically by
the famous phrase from well-known Footnote 4 from United States v. Carolene
Products458—has historically harbored its interests in protecting “discrete and
insular minorities”459 based on protected group traits rather than on individual
liberties,460 existing tensions between the protection of traits and the weight of
individual autonomy have for some time called into question the workability of
various anti-discrimination protections. For instance, in the context of race
discrimination, the historical group-minded theory behind anti-discrimination laws
has been challenged by multiracial individuals and the concept of elective race that
reinforces an individual’s right to racial self-identification.461 Likewise, in the
current state of affairs, a person’s intersectionality within a discrimination claim
may pose issues regarding how his or her identity is regarded by discrimination
categories in a way that results in the law interfering with a person’s own selfdeterminative right to identify with one group over another.462
In another way, however, these tensions do not necessarily pose a problem for
our concepts of equality and liberty in a modern democratic state—but merely
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show us how to delineate regulations that accurately reflect those ideas and
promote anti-discrimination. In the constitutional realm, autonomy and equality
have often been intertwined in cases dealing with sexual orientation
discrimination.463 One of the most notable examples of this was Lawrence, where
the rights of privacy and intimacy were equally extended to individuals practicing
same-sex intimacy, with the underlying idea that previous criminalization of such
conduct was geared to targeting homosexuals.464 In the post-Windsor marriage
cases, a similar framework that intertwined liberty and equality was used to extend
the fundamental right to marry that has always been available to opposite-sex
couples to same-sex couples.465 Kennedy later devoted an explicit section in
Obergefell that touched upon how “[r]ights implicit in liberty and rights secured by
equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always coextensive, yet
in some instances each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the
other.”466 What appears as tension can also perhaps be viewed in the same way as
the animus-dignity connection could be viewed: as a negotiation or mediating
device that allows for contemporary intertwining of these concepts to contextualize
current issues within discrimination and signal how to resolve them doctrinally, as
well as incrementally signal reforms.
This observation is promising for incrementalism and the elevation of
protections that envelop sexual orientation in the political afternoon after Windsor
and Obergefell. If one of the underlying goals of marriage equality was to effectuate
and pave a path to heightened protections for sexual minorities, then further
developments that play into this negotiation will continue these discussions after
the legalities of the same-sex marriage issue has been definitively resolved. Further
advances in anti-discrimination protection for sexual orientation could benefit from
the recent SmithKline, Wymyslo, and Obergefell developments of autonomy in
conceptualizing sexual orientation as a protected class.
For instance, placing sexual orientation firmly within the category of protected
traits in Title VII could be the next step in the incrementalist climb after marriage
equality that constructively leverages the developments from the same-sex marriage
movement forward as means to an even larger political end. Although Title VII
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does not expressly include sexual orientation as a protectable category,467 there is
already some slippage within what “because of sex” means in claims addressing
gender-stereotyping that allows some individuals to assert arguments that factually
involve sexual orientation discrimination and also qualify as gender-stereotyping.468
Originally, Congress intended to enact Title VII on the basis of protecting race,469
but other categories, such as gender, were added in subsequent amendments.470 The
complex interplay between the characteristics of sex and gender has gradually
carved out a line of cases, including Supreme Court precedent in Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins,471 that have adjudicated Title VII cases in situations where genderstereotyping was at play under the Act’s definition of discrimination “because of
sex.”472 Couching this idea in Judith Butler’s terms,473 the performative or
expressive aspects of gender have broader—and perhaps fuzzier—borders than
biological sex-determinacy or inferences.474 Although other gender-stereotyping
cases have articulated that the gender-stereotyping theory cannot not be utilized to
“bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII,”475 sexual minorities
have been able to lodge discrimination claims in situations where they were
marginalized harmfully when the expressive aspects of their personal identity based
on their sexual orientation belied conventional expectations about their biological
sex; however, such results have varied.476
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This notion of marginalization or discrimination against individual gender
expressions based on dominant expectations of sex—harnessing aspects of
essentialism to bolster one idea of what it means “to be a man or a woman” in order
to eclipse other ideas—takes a toll on personal autonomy. In this way, such harms
resemble the context of discrimination that the animus-dignity connection
illustrated in Wymyslo, which was helpful for evaluating the immutability of sexual
orientation—i.e. the idea that sexual orientation plays a fundamental part in
shaping personal choice and identity, so discrimination targeted against sexual
orientation would hinder autonomy and lack constitutional support.477 Both
instances share concerns for personal autonomy in the midst of safeguarding
against discrimination, and both have associations with marginalization based on
sexual orientation. In a side-by-side comparison, there could be enough overlap
between gender-stereotyping cases in Title VII and Wymyslo’s rendering—and
Obergefell’s loose bolstering—of sexual orientation as an immutable trait to
eventually broaden the interpretation of “because of sex” in Title VII.
Also, because Title VII protects groups based on common traits, the
immutability of traits features importantly into Title VII’s calculation over which
members of society to protect.478 This could provide another way in for adding
protection for sexual orientation in Title VII. In essence, protected Title VII
categories reflect characteristics of identity that have been rendered immutable, and
courts have recognized this aspect of Title VII anti-discrimination.479 Despite the
sometimes-waning reliance on the immutability factor, even by the Supreme Court,
and despite the existence of other factors for determining protected classes in equal
protection cases,480 at some level both equality jurisprudence and Title VII rely on
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immutability as a criterion for higher levels of anti-discrimination protection.481 All
of these observations seem to build toward an idea based on the momentum and
sentiments from the Obergefell ruling on marriage and the sentiments from the
post-Windsor marriage cases that reached suspect classification and heightened
scrutiny for sexual orientation, which consequently ought to provoke a normative
response to expand Title VII’s perspective to include sexual orientation. As Nancy
Levit notes, “Employment discrimination law is also most successful when it calls
attention to normative changes.”482 A new norm is now upon us. Perhaps a
response to this shift will eventually result in the protection of sexual orientation
based on an immutability standard that underscores personal autonomy.
However, given the current delay and mixed results with efforts to pass the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) in Congress,483 any advancements
for furthering sexual orientation protection in Title VII will likely not come from a
congressional amendment to the Act;484 political and congressional actors are not
aligned enough to reach a consensus on LGBTQ rights, even with recent
leveraging of marriage equality—again, a ceiling in the incremental path. The lessthan-favorable congressional environment for ENDA, however, does not mean
that pro-LGBTQ changes in Title VII will necessarily fail as well. Thus, with the
expansions of protected categories in other federal anti-discrimination laws, Levit
has also observed that “[i]n the interim, doctrinal advances may be the best way to
expand the reach of the categories of people protected.”485 To that effect, Levin
asserts that “[o]ne way to enlarge protections under existing statutes is to redefine
the boundaries of the protected categories.”486 In this vein, Levin also offers
gender-stereotyping as a possible example of how doctrinal advances might help
expand Title VII protections for sexual orientation.487 Tying this notion back to
recent post-Windsor judicial advancements, the developments from SmithKline,
Wymyslo, and Obergefell might have given some starting traction to future judicial
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advances by LGBTQ litigants. Thus, if courts are the first route, then the postmarriage equality advances therein must continue to stoke the discussion of the
immutability of sexual orientation and find influence in the marriage cases that
have adopted a better anti-stereotyping approach to immutability than the
approach that emphasized biological mutability, such as Wymyslo, and cases that
found heightened scrutiny suitable for sexual orientation, such as SmithKline. Sex
discrimination in Title VII needs an expansion; this expanision is warranted by a
reflection from the successes in marriage equality and the norms for sexual
minorities envisioned by same-sex marriages.
In another legal realm, the emerging emphasis on personal autonomy in sexual
orientation from Wymyslo and Obergefell can also stoke an interesting tension
when instances of progress in sexual orientation anti-discrimination potentially
encroach on the boundaries of religious liberty. With marriage, where regulation is
in the purview of state governments, autonomy and fundamental rights of same-sex
couples trumped the beliefs, including religious ones, that “[m]arriage . . . is by its
nature a gender-differentiated union of man and woman.”488 How will this
strengthened view on the autonomy of same-sex couples and sexual minorities play
into conflicts in other legal arenas, private and public, when sexual minorities are
singled out or marginalized based on the exercise of religious beliefs that find
homosexuality morally blameworthy? Shortly after Obergefell, there were various
discussions about possible incidents of small business owners falling back on
religious beliefs as a reason for denying services to same-sex couples.489 In the
public sphere, the most prominent conflict was exhibited by Kim Davis, the county
clerk in Rowan County, Kentucky, who refused to recognize and process the
marriage applications of same-sex couples by resorting to a religious
accommodation defense based on conscience when she declined to place her
signature on marriage licenses.490 In Utah, a juvenile court judge ordered a lesbian
couple to give up their infant foster daughter so that the daughter could be sent to a
home with heterosexual parents.491 Can the animus-dignity connection from
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Obergefell be adequately imported here to effectuate similar arguments about
discrimination? Economics might eventually take care of the frequency of these
incidences over time in private businesses.492 Kentucky Governor Steve Beshear
eventually declared valid all the otherwise noncompliant marriage applications of
same-sex couples filed in Rowan County during the Davis incident.493 The Sixth
Circuit denied Davis’ request to delay issuing marriage licenses to same-sex
couples.494 And, after a week of controversial media coverage that condemned the
Utah judge’s decision, Judge Scott N. Johansen eventually retracted his decision to
remove a foster child from the care of her lesbian parents.495 These repeated
incidents of post-Obergefell marginalization stoke the conversation over
discrimination based on sexual orientation and are apt to serve as the back-andforth progress in a movement that relies heavily on incremental gesturing. PostObergefell, such episodes are holding patterns in the national consciousness to the
next image of significant progress. Over and over, each incident can be
characterized more easily along the arch of Kennedy’s animus-dignity narrative in
Obergefell—using animus and dignity concepts continuously to convince us that
exclusion based on sexual orientation is not just an example of marginalization of a
particular group that is merely offensive, but such marginalization that could be or
ought to be considered redressable discrimination because such episodes share such
themes as Obergefell.
Particularly in the aftermath of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,496 in which the Court
held that private entities have some right to religious freedom,497 the underscoring
of the autonomy of sexual minorities, especially using the concept of immutability
from Wymyslo and from the fundamental rights discussions from Obergefell, could
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cause tension in the debate regarding sexual orientation anti-discrimination and
religious freedom. In other words, there could be a battle between autonomy and
autonomy—the autonomy of sexual minorities to be who they are, and the
autonomy of those whose religious beliefs may not have accepting views of sexual
minorities being who they are.
What is interesting here is that there are some strong similarities between the
two autonomies. Taking a page from how religion receives a special status under
the law and is mutable in a literal sense, as one can change religious affiliations,
Kramer notes that within current notions about sex and gender, particularly with
transgender individuals, sex and gender are more like religion in terms of
immutability.498 Religion, of course, is immutable based on a standard closer to the
one from Wymyslo. So, in his comparison between religion and sex as protected
traits, Kramer advocates that “[m]aybe we need a softer definition of
immutability.”499 The effect would be an emphasis on autonomy, which we have
seen this standard to be capable of ascribing: “Under this view, immutability is
more about the effect of changing one’s identity rather than the ability to change
it.”500 Freedoms do have limits. How the use of this standard would adjudicate
instances of sexual orientation discrimination based on conduct that also reflects
constitutionally protected religious freedom remains to be seen. But moving toward
this notion of immutability for sexual minorities in the future of antidiscrimination would seem to incrementally strengthen the case against
discrimination.
Lastly, the developments here for recognizing autonomy in sexual identity and
its emphasis in these recent marriage cases, particularly in Kennedy’s equal
protection rationales in Windsor and Obergefell, may also be a way that legal
developments in equality jurisprudence are taking nascent steps to shift away from
traditional application and interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment equality, away
from categorical thinking about diversity that manifests in tiered-scrutiny, and
toward a regime and a language that is more workable. Perhaps, in contrast to how
our anti-discrimination laws address discrimination, trait discrimination is, as many
have echoed, becoming increasingly outdated or non-functional, and ideas about
discrimination are becoming more focused on individuals rather than group
identities.501
To reiterate constitutional ideals about self-determinism, the autonomy of
sexual minorities must then be necessarily protected to be continually safeguarded.
Such autonomy must be brought into equal recognition and fortification under our
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laws and not be made malleable to discrimination. The “softer” immutability
standard used by Wymyslo and endorsed by Obergefell and the spotlight on the
autonomy of sexual minorities would seem to both further an increment toward
reflecting those changing norms about the way society regards identity construction
and self-invention, while serving to protect those norms at the same time.
Admittedly, using a different standard of immutability that could help successfully
evaluate sexual orientation as a protectable trait in order to reify further protections
for sexual orientation under Title VII, which cabins autonomy in traditional
equality language and relegates it as only a compromise in the face of changing
norms about how we think of identity. But advances in incrementalism always have
externalities.502 Identity is more slippery than our current laws suppose and should
defy categorical thinking.503 As Kramer has observed, “[W]hen it comes to
developing anti-discrimination protections, the lived experience of discrimination
should determine the doctrine and not the other way around.”504 Indeed, from
these cases we can see that our lived experiences have changed and ought to be
reflected in the law as improved protection for sexual minorities. The use of
autonomy here would likely reflect the change in such lived experiences.
CONCLUSION
In 1984, Ronald Reagan took his metaphorical “morning after” re-election
victory for a second term. In 2015, Windsor’s morning after eventually led to a
success in Obergefell for marriage equality. Yet unlike presidential terms of office,
the LGBTQ political movement does not have term limits. Progress for the
movement is coming continually, with starts and stops at each increment. In this
regard, the recent developments for sexual orientation in equal protection claims
from the post-Windsor cases and Obergefell are notable for their potential to push
beyond marriage equality and leverage for changes in federal anti-discrimination
laws that favor protecting sexual minorities. These developments provide
momentum not only for the law to recognize the significance of sexual identities,
but also for us to uncover how individual autonomy rights, so regularly valued in
modern concepts of self-determinism, are hindered when such recognition is
refused.
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Hence, the particular morning after Windsor and the afternoon of Obergefell
may be one bright, sunny, daytime period of revel, but it is also another increment
of strategizing toward the next set of progresses that awaits. For if we have some
doctrinal momentum, then these recent developments must move us forward into
an evening when we can put sexual orientation discrimination to bed and then
hopefully onto future days of normalization.

